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Abstract 
Will the increase in the number of labour immigrants after the EU enlargements in 2004, 
2007 and 2013, in the context of having to comply with the regulation of coordinated social 
security from EU, harm levels of general trust in Norway? If so can a decline in the levels of 
general trust come to challenge the legitimacy of the Scandinavian welfare state? 
The European community has always emphasized the importance of the four principles of free 
movement to the success and prosperity of its internal market; one of these four is the free 
movement of people in order to successfully implement the principle of free movement of 
people and enhance mobility and flexibility in the internal labour market; the coordinated 
social security rights were introduced. These ensures that when citizens from the internal 
market in the European economic area (EEA) takes on employment in another EEA country; 
they are treated equally along the lines of full citizens under the domestic social 
security(NOU, 2011 p. 113-115). In 2004, 2007 and 2013 European Union (EU) membership 
was extended to 11 new countries from Central and Eastern Europe. Their lower levels of 
economic development compared to most of the current countries in the EEA at that time 
caused concern in the public and among scholars, regarding how the enlargement would 
affect the internal market. Due to the gap in wage levels and the welfare program provided by 
the state in the eastern and the western EEA countries, one of these concerns was that the 
western countries would be in danger of becoming “magnets” to labour immigration from the 
east(Kvist, 2004).  With the coordinated social security rights in the EU, the role of the 
modern citizenship as guardian of the social citizenship and a tool for solidarity-building is 
obviously weakened.  
In Scandinavia the support of the welfare state has historically been even stronger and 
remained even more stable than anywhere else in Europe (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Simultaneously Scandinavian states are known for having exceptional high levels of general 
trust in their society compared to the rest of the world(NOU, 2011 p. 47). After the EU 
enlargement in 2004 and onwards, Norway experienced a strong increase in the number of 
labour immigrants from the EU. Currently labour immigrants from Eastern European EU 
countries have become the largest group of labour immigrants in Norway(Ministry, 2010-
2011 p. 19). Speculations on how this would affect the legitimacy of the Norwegian welfare 
state, and what welfare benefits would be most attractive to these labour immigrants surfaced.   
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1.0 Introduction 
The European community has always emphasized the importance of the four principles of 
free movement to the success and prosperity of its internal market; one of these four is the 
free movement of people
1
. The 1990s represented a time where the European integration 
process and the implementation of the four freedoms were stepped up (Kautto et al., 2001 
p.169). The social policy area has always been and remains an important source of legitimacy 
for the national governments. Consequently the member states of the European Union(EU) 
have been very reluctant in sharing any of its powers in the social realm with the 
supranational institutions of EU(Ferrera, 2005). During the mid-1970s there were a shift in 
attitudes on the international level, triggered by the economic crisis and the increasing levels 
of unemployment that followed it. Unemployment was thought to be the main source for why 
EU had not yet been able to successfully implement the 4 freedoms. Both the EU and the 
organization for economic co-operation and development (OECD) concluded that social 
security arrangements had an essential effect on employment levels. Research from OECD 
eventually exposed that a stronger focus on active measures in social security within the 
borders of the union would be the best solution to combat unemployment (Kautto et al., 2001 
p. 169).  In order to successfully implement the principle of free movement of people and 
enhance mobility and flexibility in the internal labour market; the coordinated social security 
rights were introduced. These ensures that when citizens from the internal market in the 
European economic area (EEA) takes on employment in another EEA country; they are 
treated equally along the lines of full citizens under the domestic social security(NOU, 2011 
p. 113-115). 
In 2004, 2007 and 2013 European Union (EU) membership was extended to 11 new countries 
from Central and Eastern Europe. Their lower levels of economic development compared to 
most of the current countries in the EEA at that time caused concern in the public and among 
scholars, regarding how the enlargement would affect the internal market. Due to the gap in 
wage levels and the welfare program provided by the state in the eastern and the western EEA 
countries, one of these concerns was that the western countries would be in danger of 
becoming “magnets” to labour immigration from the east(Kvist, 2004). In continental Europe 
the legitimacy of the welfare state has typically been associated with questions of solidarity, a 
solidarity closely linked to and strengthened by the institution of the modern 
                                                     
1
 Four freedoms of movement: goods, services, capital and people.   
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citizenship(Ferrera, 2005 p. 205). This is even more so in the case Scandinavia where the 
welfare programs are universal and more comprehensive than in any other European state 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). With the coordinated social security rights in the EU, the role of the 
modern citizenship as guardian of the social citizenship and a tool for solidarity-building is 
obviously weakened. However it is important to understand that the coordinated social 
security rights have never been an attempt by the supranational institutions in EU to 
harmonize the national welfare systems into one identical common European system(NOU, 
2011). On the other hand, the functioning of the internal market requires the EEA countries to 
make certain adjustments, and it is therefore not unlikely that the coordinated social security 
rights indirectly could have the potential of producing greater convergence in the area of 
welfare as well (Kautto et al., 2001 p.169). Esping-Andersen (1990), argue that one should 
not overlook the fact that the coordinated system of social security was designed and 
determined in the context of continental European countries, which have very different 
welfare state regimes compared to the Scandinavian states.  
In Scandinavia the support of the welfare state has historically been even stronger and 
remained even more stable than anywhere else in Europe (Esping-Andersen, 1990). 
Simultaneously Scandinavian states are known for having exceptional high levels of general 
trust in their society compared to the rest of the world(NOU, 2011 p. 47). After the EU 
enlargement in 2004 and onwards, Norway experienced a strong increase in the number of 
labour immigrants from the EU. Currently labour immigrants from Eastern European EU 
countries have become the largest group of labour immigrants in Norway(Ministry, 2010-
2011 p. 19). Speculations on how this would affect the legitimacy of the Norwegian welfare 
state, and what welfare benefits would be most attractive to these labour immigrants surfaced.   
Due to the limitations of this thesis, in both size and time, I have chosen to mostly focus on 
the Norwegian welfare state as a representative of the Scandinavian states. However even 
though the Scandinavian welfare states are placed within the same welfare regime, the welfare 
states and their context is never completely identical. Additionally the survey data that I have 
analysed in this thesis, only measures the perception of the Norwegian population, making it 
difficult to generalize to citizens in other Scandinavian states. My thesis will therefore give 
some insight to the general challenges posed by the coordinated social security rights to the 
legitimacy of the Scandinavian welfare models; but mostly my analysis will be relevant to the 
Norwegian society and welfare state.  
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My research question for this thesis will therefore be; “Will the increase in the number of 
labour immigrants after the EU enlargements in 2004, 2007 and 2013, in the context of 
having to comply with the regulation of coordinated social security from EU, harm levels of 
general trust in Norway? If so can a decline in the levels of general trust come to challenge 
the legitimacy of the Scandinavian welfare state?  
 
1.1 Research project: its relevance and contribution  
According to Verba (1994) there are two conditions one should take into considerations when 
deciding on a research project in social science. First of all a good research project should 
contain a research question that presents a deeper understanding of how and why something 
affects and matters to peoples’ lives. Secondly my research project must make a contribution 
to the literature in the field of political science, by constructing verified scientific explanations 
of some aspects of the world. This contribution to the field of political science can come by 
using a new theoretical approach, gathering empirical findings, or/and by using a specific 
methodological method to search for new empirical findings that can answer or give a new 
perspective to the field of research (Verba, 1994 p. 15).  
The modern welfare state has since its establishment in the 1960s and 1970s become an 
important influence in the lives of its citizens. Especially in the Scandinavia peoples’ lives are 
at one point or several dependent on the welfare programs that the welfare state has to offer 
them (NOU, 2011). The modern welfare states, the willingness to contribute and the 
legitimacy of its redistribution efforts, were designed in the context of the nation state and the 
modern citizenship(Ferrera, 2005). Theoretically my research project contributes to the 
literature in political science studying the connection between solidarity and the welfare state, 
and the functions of boundaries in enhancing this community feeling. 
Methodologically and empirically my research project contributes to the literature in the field 
of political science studying the effect of globalization on the solidarity feeling. Solidarity is 
thought to be an important component of the welfare state and especially the Scandinavian 
welfare states. Since the 1980s literature in the field of political science, debating how 
globalization might force the modern welfare states to retrench has been present Still the trust 
in the state and the fellow citizens, have remained high in Scandinavia compared to the rest of 
Europe. In the 1980s many western European states became more influenced by ideas from 
neo-capitalism(Kuhnle, 2000 p. 218-223). Studying the level of general trust in Norway after 
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the 2004 enlargement, have relevance to the literature on globalization and welfare; because 
the implications of having coordinated social security rules did not really affect Norway much 
prior to 2004. Therefore with the development on the Norwegian labour market that happened 
after the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 (Olsen, 2013 p. 60-61), Norway seems like a 
representative case when studying the impact of European integration on the levels of general 
trust and indirectly the legitimacy of the Scandinavian welfare state. On the one hand labour 
immigration and its effects on the welfare programs occasionally becomes a hot topic in the 
Norwegian media. On the other hand due to the recentness of the EU enlargements and its 
effect on the labour market in Norway, the scholarly literature in political science is not yet 
too evolved in this area. I therefore hope my research project can contribute with an insight 
into how the EU enlargements to Eastern Europe; is affecting Norway and whether it could 
come to affect the legitimacy of the Norwegian welfare state.  
The importance of this research question to the peoples’ lives are also in the case that these 
new realities can be found to actually damage the solidarity feeling and materialize into 
demands for welfare restructuring.  With coordinated social security rights, national 
politicians within the EEA are no longer able to distinguish on the basis of citizenship, 
between who has access or not to their national welfare programs. Consequently cutbacks in 
welfare programs will implicate all welfare recipients whether they are full citizens or only 
labour immigrants from other EEA countries(NOU, 2011).  
 
1.2 The structure of this thesis 
 
In chapter two I will start out with some necessary background information. In order to get a 
better understanding of the modern welfare state I will first give a brief insight into their 
development and their objectives. Secondly I will clarify what types of welfare state 
categories there are, and what the literature defines their main commonalities and differences 
to be. From here I will take a closer look at the Scandinavian welfare regime, and more 
specifically the Norwegian welfare state, to get an essence of what makes their institutional 
design in the face of globalization, more vulnerable than compared to other welfare states. 
Secondly I will give the reader an introduction into the development of the coordinated social 
security rights in the EU and why the 2004, 2008 and 2013 EU enlargements caused so much 
turmoil compared to previous enlargements. Thirdly I will introduce the empirical effects that 
  
5 
 
these EU enlargements have had on the Norwegian labour market both nationally and 
regionally. The chapter will end with a presentation of what implications the social 
coordinated security rights from EU have had on the Norwegian domestic social security 
benefits.  
In chapter three I will present the theoretical framework of my thesis. I will briefly mention 
the power-resource model as it has been an important influence in the political science 
literature on the welfare state. In my thesis I will be using a theory of path-dependency and 
more specifically a legitimacy explanation when studying the institutional reproduction of 
general trust and institutional legitimacy. Thereafter I will use social capital theory to describe 
why general trust is so important for the legitimacy of the welfare state, before discussing the 
impact of boundary-structuring on general trust. At last I will end the chapter by theorizing 
the concept that I will be using in the statistical analysis.  
In the fourth chapter I will present the data, the operationalization of my concepts and the 
method of statistical analysis.    
In the fifth chapter I will present some descriptive statistics before I present my findings from 
the statistical analysis.   
In chapter six I will present the conclusion of this research thesis and discuss how my findings 
relate to the research question and the theoretical framework.    
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2.0  Background information  
 
2.1 The modern welfare state: The three welfare regimes   
The idea that the state was to somewhat degree responsible for citizens economically and 
social welfare had already in the early 20
th
 century, started to take root in the Western 
European states (Kuhnle, 2000 p.209). From the 1950s and up until the 1970s, the citizens in 
Western Europe increasingly demanded more social rights, which eventually led to a great 
expansion of the national welfare programs (Hatland et al., 2001 p.13-15). During this time 
period the welfare state became a vital component of the modern citizenship in Western 
Europe. The boundaries of the nation state consequently became the territorial markers of 
who were to encompass as the insiders or/and outsiders of the welfare state(Ferrera, 2005 
p.44-45).  According to Susycki and Karolewski (2013 p. 38) the welfare state can very 
simplified be defined as a system of state organized redistribution, which organizes 
redistribution of life opportunities throughout life cycles by granting their citizens a social 
citizenship(Susycki and Karolewski, 2013 p. 38) . A social citizenship meaning that all 
citizens are granted social rights based on their legal status as citizens and not their 
performance or position in society. From this definition the welfare state becomes a 
counteractive tool attempting to reduce the negative consequences of the free market by de-
commodifying labour (Esping-Andersen, 1990 p. 21).  
Combining the social citizenship with the institution of the modern citizenship made it 
conceivable for the state to overlook and demand that all citizens of the nation state 
contributed to the welfare state(!!! INVALID CITATION !!!). Furthermore the compulsory 
membership practices made it possible for the national authority to effectively pool resources 
needed for redistribution, through either a flat rate or proportional taxation(Ferrera, 2005). It 
gave the state both a larger and a more stable pool of resources, making it possible for them to 
produce more welfare and eventually extend the reach of its welfare program to the majority 
of its citizens. It could now take on more costly welfare entitlements like unemployment, 
family break-up or disability which often would be too costly to manage for the individual 
through private insurance (Susycki and Karolewski, 2013 p. 38)..  
The modern welfare states that evolved during the 1950s have certain structural similarities. 
On the other hand the level of de-commodifying and social stratification effect that they 
embody varies. Esping-Andersen (1990 p.26-27), concludes that the modern welfare states 
can be classified into three types of welfare regimes; the Conservative, the Liberal and the 
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Scandinavian or also called the Social-democratic welfare regime. The study by Esping-
Andersen (1990) caused massive debate in the welfare literature, and despite criticism the 
classification of the three welfare regimes still holds strong empirical support 20 years 
later(NOU, 2011 p. 46-7). In the Liberal welfare regime most welfare provisions are means 
tested, and there are a very modest universal transfer. Benefits are usually very limited, and 
are mainly targeting low class clientele. The majority of the population is encouraged to 
subscribe to private insurance coverage; and there is a general belief in the society that a too 
generous welfare state would only come to harm the work ethics of the population. “The 
archetypical example of this model are the US, Canada and Australia”(Esping-Andersen, 
1990 p.26-27). In Western Europe however the most common model has been the 
Conservative welfare regime; for instance in Austria, France, Germany and Italy. Unlike the 
liberal model the private insurance has played a minor role here as the welfare provisions 
offered by the welfare state was also “upgraded to cater to the new post-industrial class 
structure”. However the link between rights, employment and level of contribution are 
strong. In addition to a more traditional approach to family hood, meaning that the welfare 
state will only interfere when family are unable (Esping-Andersen, 1990 p.27). The final 
welfare regime is the Scandinavian welfare regime, which is clustered in the Scandinavian 
states. Here the social rights are universal to all citizens, and the benefits are usually extended 
to almost all realms of life unlike the case of the liberal and the conservative welfare regimes. 
The welfare states in Scandinavia also extend the effort of ensuring individuals’ autonomy 
from the traditional family hood as well as they attempt to de-commodity them from the 
market. At last the Scandinavian welfare states distinguishes themselves from the other 
welfare regimes by having granted welfare benefits and social rights that are generous enough 
to also have a de-commodifying effect on the new middle class. The costs of having such a 
generous welfare states makes the Scandinavian welfare states highly committed to 
maximizing employment levels, unlike the liberal and conservative model. In the liberal 
model the level of employment is determined by the market and in the conservative model the 
traditional approach to family hood discourages female employment levels(Esping-Andersen, 
1990 p.27-28).  
2.1.1 The Scandinavian welfare regime: universal and generous 
When comparing the whole OECD-area the Nordic welfare states have as defined in the study 
of Esping-Andersen (1990) certain similarities. The Nordic countries can be characterized by 
being small and open economies, where they have managed to combine economic growth and 
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stability with a well-functioning labour market. A labour market with the goal of high 
employment levels, even income distribution,  a high standard of living and a large degree of 
social equality(NOU, 2011 p. 47). The principle of universalism first appeared in Great 
Britain and in the Scandinavian welfare states, but it was not until the 1950s-1970s that the 
Scandinavian welfare states came to develop distinctive features beyond the universal flat rate 
welfare entitlements. The labour movement became the driving force behind social protests 
and claims for more democracy in Scandinavia.  In the post-war era, following the 2
nd
 world 
war, the modern welfare state in Norway and the rest of Scandinavia blossomed with new 
welfare arrangements being added as well as the benefits and services becoming more 
generous. In Norway this was both due to historical preconditions beneficial to broad 
coalition building as well as the extraordinary opportunity structure created by the unifying 
experience of warfare and the incentive to ensure a peaceful time ahead. . After massive 
expansion of welfare entitlements as a result of high economic growth and strong political 
consensus toward the value of social citizenship – the Scandinavian welfare regime appeared. 
The result was a welfare state that was well-institutionalized and that had a high degree of 
legitimacy among its citizens(Kildal and Kuhnle, 2005) 
Traditionally welfare can have 4 major providers; state, market, civil and society and family. 
In Scandinavia the state became very early on the main provider of welfare, unlike other 
states where the church or the market has been more dominant. As a result of the extensive 
services that the state provides, the trust of the state is much higher in Scandinavia than 
anywhere else. One argument to why the Scandinavian countries have managed to develop 
such a generous and inclusive welfare, welfare citizens are willing to uphold trough heavy 
taxing; is that they have had relatively small and homogenous populations in terms of 
language, culture and religion(Kuhnle, 2000 p. 209). Bay and Pedersen (2006 p. 419-20), find 
that in order to uphold the popular support toward the welfare state and its efforts to 
redistribute wealth among its citizens, and thereby ensuring a general well-being and safety in 
the society, there are certain strategies necessary. More specifically that “most social security 
systems are designed to appeal to the self-interest of taxpayers and to notions of reciprocity 
by linking benefits to prior contributions”(Bay and Pedersen, 2006). In all welfare regimes 
there are certain welfare provisions that the majority of the population all contribute to, but 
where it is unlikely that the majority will come to benefit from. In the Scandinavian case the 
popular support toward the state and the society taking responsibility for the social- and 
economic well-being of its citizens is much stronger than in any of the other welfare regimes 
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described by Esping-Andersen (1990). Bay and Pedersen (2006 p.420), concludes that certain 
social transfers are not possible to explain out of pure self-interest, but rather that they “rather 
require a higher degree of trust, identification and sympathy with fellow citizens and/or 
strong commitment to egalitarian values”. Several surveys show that the Scandinavian states 
are all characterized by citizens that have exceptional high degree of support toward the 
welfare state. The empirical evidence also reveal that the citizens in Scandinavian expresses 
more trust toward their fellow citizens as well as the authorities, than any other place in 
Europe(NOU, 2011 p. 47).  
 
Norwegian welfare state 
Although there are certain similarities between the welfare states in Scandinavia there are also 
a series of important differences. That discussion is unfortunately too complex as well as too 
time and space consuming for my thesis. Here I will therefore mainly be describing the main 
goals and characteristics of the Norwegian welfare model without much concerns for how it 
compares or not to the other Scandinavian states(NOU, 2011 p. 47).  
First of all the Norwegian welfare model is characterized by a state that actively attempts to 
ensure high level of employment, through good quality public education and a focus on active 
employment policy measures. Secondly there is a strongly regulated labour market, with a 
three-way negotiation process between a strong employee and employer organization. 
Welfare programs connected to health, caretaking and education are mainly public and 
financed through tax.  More or less all citizens use public welfare, and the use of private 
insurance are limited compared to outside of Scandinavia. The programs are characterized by 
good quality and deeply rooted individual rights – rights that are connected to the individual 
citizen and not to the level of contribution. Next the welfare state in Norway has also 
developed a set of universal welfare programs offering generous transfers connected to 
unemployment, sickness, disability and aging(NOU, 2011 p. 47). The financing of certain 
welfare transfers, like education, requires high solidarity between generations – even more so 
the case with pensions where the financing through social security is not sufficient making it 
necessary to fund it further by tax in a pay-as-you-go system. Pension transfers will therefore  
be highly dependent on the age composition of the contributors and receivers in the society 
(NOU, 2011 p.48-53). The welfare state in Norway is driven by both a political agenda to 
promote social inclusion of all citizens in the society, as well as an agenda to ensure the 
economic sustainability of the welfare state. The authorities actively uses the welfare state to 
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increase the level of employment among all groups; gender, age, immigration or 
disability(NOU, 2011 p.47-49) - one example can be economic incentives to the 
employer(NOU, 2011 p.56). Simultaneously there is a high acceptance in the Norwegian 
welfare state that not everyone has the ability to contribute or participate in the labour market, 
and if so it is the responsibility of the welfare state to secure that they maintain an appropriate 
standard of living. On a micro level the principle of universalism do not require the 
individual’s welfare transfer and service costs to correspond with one’s contribution to the 
welfare state. On the other hand a lot of the minimum transfers connected to healthy 
individuals in the welfare program require the individual to actively search for employment or 
take part in programs that can make them equipped for the labour market if possible, or 
transfers can be withheld. Some social security transfers connected to healthy individuals are 
also time limited and can require the individual to have contributed a certain amount or time; 
to be eligible for transfers adequate for maintaining a normal life. On the macro level on the 
other hand the amount of tax collected income must be high enough to cover the total costs of 
the welfare state – high employment levels are therefore a prerequisite for the sustainability of 
a high quality and generous welfare state like the Norwegian welfare state(NOU, 2011 p.47-
49). Another central element of the Norwegian welfare state – and also the other Scandinavian 
welfare states – is how it actively is used as a tool for redistribution, with progressive income 
taxation and taxation of for example inheritance or assets. The standard allowance shields the 
lowest incomes, while increasing marginal taxes ensures that those with higher income 
contributes relatively more than those with lower incomes (NOU, 2011 p. 53).  “It is not the 
arrangement in itself of the interaction between the different institutions; strong employer and 
employee organizations, high employment levels and a welfare state offering comprehensive 
economic security that distinguishes Norway from the other Scandinavian welfare states, but 
rather the institutional balance and how they contribute to reinforcing each other’s manner of 
operation”(NOU, 2011 p.48).  
Globalization and the Scandinavian welfare state:  
In more current time globalization has caused people to question the survival of the welfare 
states, and some urges the developed welfare states of Western Europe to substantially 
downsize their welfare provisions, and that this would be the only way to maintain the future 
social protection and citizenship rights of the neediest. “Cutting welfare costs and provisions 
would be necessary to secure national economies “international competitiveness” and to 
prevent overly inflows of migrants from poorer countries”(Susycki and Karolewski, 2013 p. 
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37). The combination of a both vertical and a horizontal axis of resource reallocation in the 
European welfare states; vertical being from healthy to sick or employed to unemployed, and 
horizontal being from rich to poor(Ferrera, 2005 p.44-45), is one of the arguments to why the 
welfare state has so much more legitimacy in the continental Europe than compared with the 
US. The welfare regime in the US is closer to the liberal model defined by Esping-Andersen 
(1990), and in this model  the welfare state is mainly focused on the horizontal axis. 
Consequently one of the arguments to why Americans’ are less supportive of the welfare 
state, is that they feel that the benefits are allocated largely to undeserving groups (Susycki 
and Karolewski, 2013 p. 38-39). The Scandinavian welfare regimes on the other hand have 
both an extensive horizontal and a vertical axis, simultaneously as the legitimacy of the 
welfare state has remained on a very high level among all social strata. From this line of 
argument we might argue that if the Scandinavian welfare states give into the pressure of 
reducing the vertical axis of their welfare program; this might a come to endanger the strong 
legitimacy of the welfare state.  
 In the 1980s Scandinavia was like all European countries, also affected by the economic 
down turn with declining GDP and higher unemployment levels. During this time period there 
was also an ideological change toward smaller state in the Western world in general, and calls 
for possible welfare retrenchments. However the support of the welfare state has remained 
high among all social strata in Scandinavia and the universal welfare provisions even more so 
than the selective ones. The Scandinavian states were not equally affected by the economic 
downturn, and Sweden and Finland hit hardest by the crisis were also those who carried out 
the most welfare retrenchments(Kuhnle, 2000 p.210-212). As a consequence of the lucrative 
petroleum sector in Norway, the economic downturn in the 1980s did not affect Norway as 
much, and despite the steadily growing spending in social security there was not much 
retrenchment introduced compared to Finland and Sweden. During the 1990s the support of 
the welfare program remained high, but there were a stronger demand of control in Norway to 
avoid abuse(Hatland et al., 2001 p. 18-35). Kuhnle (2000 p.211), argue that “often the 
political has been more important for the welfare development than the economically”, and 
the main reason why the Scandinavian states embarked on welfare retrenchments in the 
1980/90s was more likely a direct cause of the economic situation and not a political 
statement. The economies in the Scandinavian states have since the 1990s grown steadily, and 
the welfare states despite some retrenchments and adjustments have remained universal and 
generous in Scandinavia (Kuhnle, 2000 p. 218-223).  
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2.2 Coordinated social security schemes in the EU      
In 1958 the European community adopted their first provision on the coordination of social 
security schemes for migrant workers.  After this the coordinated social security schemes 
were amended in 1971 by the 1408/71/EC regulation, where issues of conflicting legislation 
in the area of social protection of employed or self-employed persons and their families using 
their right to free movement, were addressed. Several enlargements and bilateral agreements 
later (Martinsen, 2005 p.45-46) the coordinated social security schemes today covers 28 EU 
states, all three EEA states  and Switzerland(EC, 2013).  Deciding what benefits the national 
social security system actually should entail and what the conditions (contribution 
time/residence) for receiving these transfers or services should be, still remains a national 
prerogative. Coordination of social security schemes is only a tool to solve social security 
issues that arises when people are practicing their right to move freely across state borders 
within the internal market. The personal scope of the coordinated social security schemes 
have gradually been expanded to include not only migrant workers, but also self-employed 
workers, civil servants, students, pensioners and non-active individuals(Martinsen, 2005). The 
European Commission(EC) and the European Court of Justice(ECJ) have since the 1990s 
actively extended the material benefits that the coordination encompasses, as well as 
disputing and clarifying which benefits are exportable (Martinsen, 2005). In 2004 the 
regulation on coordinated social security 1408/71 and 574/72 was replaced by 883/2004 and 
987/2009. The regulations were adopted in order to simplify, modernise, and regulate current 
case law from ECJ rulings on coordinated social security schemes. More specifically the 
regulations extended the coordination of social security schemes to non-active individuals, 
early pensioners (laid off or voluntarily) and also to unemployment benefits for self-
employed. At last it is important to note that the coordinated social security regulations should 
as all EU law, be interpreted in consultation with judicial precedent from the ECJ(NOU, 2011 
p. 115). In the EU member states the regulations,  883/2004 and 987/2009, first came into 
force in 2010 and by 2012 in Norway (NAV, 2012b). 
The regulations of coordinated social security schemes entails a clear description defining 
which national social security laws are valid in all feasible situations that can occur when 
individuals practice their freedom of movement. This to safeguard that no one ends up either 
unsecured or with twofold amount of benefits and duties in the domestic social security 
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schemes. The coordinated social security schemes are based on 4 principles; equal treatment, 
summation, “pension-earnings” and exportability(NOU, 2011 p. 113-115).  
1) Equality:  
The principle of equality ensures that citizens who encompasses the personal scope of the 
coordination and that resides in another member state, are entitled to the equal rights as full 
citizens under the domestic social security schemes. This means that all EU -citizens residing 
within Norway’s territory are eligible for membership in the national social security system, 
with the same terms and conditions as Norwegian citizens. The principle of equality renders 
the national states ability to use citizenship as a prerequisite for welfare when dealing with 
foreigners from the EU -member states.  
2) Summation:  
Summation deals with the conditions for membership in the national social security systems, 
often based on the length or amount of contribution or residency. The right to summate is 
most applicable to more long term life benefits like pension. This gives EU-citizens the 
opportunity to sum up and transfer their contribution time or tax from one national social 
security system to another one(NOU, 2011 p. 114-115) 
2
.  
3) Pension earnings:  
The 3
rd
 principle is connected to the 2
nd
 one, and ensures that all EU-citizens that have earned 
pension benefits in more than one state within the internal market of EU, receive what they 
are entitled to even though they are no longer residing on the state’s territory. In addition the 
principle regulates how to calculate pension benefits, when one are entitled to pension from 
more than one state (contribution time etc.) (NOU, 2011 p. 114-15).  
4) Export:  
Social security benefits can be exported and disbursed in a different EU-member country. The 
4
th
 principle renders the very common prerequisite to social security benefits of only being 
disbursed to individuals keeping residency within the national territory.  
                                                     
2
 As an example; the social security system requires 3 years of contribution time before individuals can be 
eligible for pension, but with the summation one can add 2 years from one EU country with 1 year from Norway 
and thereby fulfill the required contribution time (NOU, 2011 p. 114-115) 
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2.3 Eastern- and the Western Europe reunited: Free movement of people   
In 2004 EU extended membership to 10 new states and 75 million new citizens. The new 
member states were Cyprus, Hungary, Czech Rep, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia, Slovenia and Malta. These states with exception of Malta and Cyprus can be named 
EU8
3
. In 2007 Bulgaria and Romania followed, and finally Croatia became a member of the 
EU in 2013. The EU enlargement in 2004 was the greatest enlargement ever taken place, both 
in terms of the number of states and persons entering the union. After decades where the East 
had been isolated from the west, under the iron curtain of Soviet Union(Kvist, 2004), the 
enlargements in 2004, 2007 and 2013 also had a strong symbolic significance. They were 
seen as the enlargements that would finally reunite Eastern-and Western Europe as a continent 
of democracy, freedom, peace and prosperity.  
Then it is perhaps ironic that this was also the first time in history of an EU enlargement that 
transition rules on the movement of labour was introduced as an option to the current member 
states(Kvist, 2004). Kvist (2004), argues that in connection with increased mobility, there are 
3 types of concerns on how the mobility might harm the domestic social security schemes; 
social tourism, social dumping and social raids. The one of importance to my thesis is the one 
called social raids. Concerns of social raids are concerns that by opening national labour 
markets and welfare systems to foreigners, one will get people “shopping” around for the best 
income, benefits and taxes. Work is here used as an entry ticket into the national welfare 
system, sometimes with the goal of exporting benefits to their home country.   
The transition rules allowed the current member states of the internal market to apply 
temporary national restrictions to the free movement of labour from the EU8 states, Bulgaria 
and Romania. The first two years after the 2004 and 2007 enlargement the older EU states 
could retain the same national restrictions toward labour from these new member states, as 
had been in force prior to them becoming EU members. In order to extend the restrictions for 
more than 3 years the European commission had to approve it, and in case of serious 
disturbances in the labour market restrictions could be extended maximum 7 years. However 
EU did set a couple of important limitations to the temporary restriction rules. Labour from 
the EU8, Romania and Bulgaria, despite the transition period, were to always have priority 
over labour immigrants from non-EU/EEA countries. Secondly once they were legally 
                                                     
3
 EU8 includes Czech Rep, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. The temporarily 
transition rules to restrict the labour market to the new EU members did not apply to Malta and Cyprus.  
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employed they were also entitled to the same non-discriminating treatment and rights as all 
other EU-citizens(Øverbye, 2000). The majority of the pre-2004 EU and EEA member states 
took advantage of this, while those who did not actively adjusted their social policies. The 
restrictions and social policy adjustment activities can be interpreted as a reaction to the 
assumption or fear, that western European countries with generous benefits and accessible 
labour markets would become magnets for welfare migration. This is very interesting since 
there exists very little empirical evidence that could support the theory of welfare magnets 
(Kvist, 2004). Nor has previous enlargements in the EU ever caused mass migration or similar 
concerns as the Eastern enlargements in 2004, 2007 and 2013 did. The EU8 countries GDP in 
2004 were on average only a quarter of the EU15 average this despite growth of 8-9 % from 
1995 to 2002. There was of course also varying levels of economic development among the 
Eastern European EU countries, but all in all the enlargements in 2004, 2007 and 2013 left 
EU with its internally greatest divide between rich and poor so far. The economic gap 
between the eastern and the western EU was perceived to be much more extensive compared 
to what it had ever been between south and north. Additionally the Eastern European 
countries were thought to have a much larger pool of potential migrants due to decades of 
being isolated from the west by the iron curtain of Soviet Union. While with the enlargement 
to the south in 1986, the migration potential was more or less exhausted(Kvist, 2004).   
2.4 Norway and the EU enlargements to the East     
2.4.1 Transition rules in Norway   
Norway became a member of the European Economic area after signing the EEA bilateral 
agreement in 1994.  This allows Norway the full access to the internal market and requires 
Norway to fulfil its obligations toward the four freedoms, like following the coordinated 
social security schemes(Mission.of.Norway.to.the.EU, 2012).  
The debate in Norway on transition rules in connection with the 2004 and 2007 EU 
enlargements was highly influenced by the alternating opinions of the Swedish government. 
In the end Sweden did not introduce transition rules, but the debate had by then spurred up 
heavy media coverage in Norway on “how the wives of polish season workers would become 
rich on Norwegian care allowance”. Simultaneously an increasing concern among trade 
unions and the political opposition; that the pressure on Norwegian labour markets would 
become enormous if Norway was the only Scandinavian country without restrictions finally 
led to the introduction of transition rules in Norway (Kvist, 2004). The transition rules in were 
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used both in 2004 toward labour immigrants from EU8 as well as Romania and Bulgaria in 
2007(sosialdepartementet, 2012). In practice this mean that citizens from these Eastern 
European EU-countries had to continue to apply for approval from the national government 
before being allowed take work in Norway(sosialdepartementet, 2012). Mostly approval was 
given to those labour immigrants who had been offered full time work, where salary and  
working conditions were adequate according to the collective regulation agreement in 
Norway(Arbeidstilsynet).  
The introduction of transition rules toward labour immigration was rather surprising from an 
economic perspective. The demand for labour between 2002 to 2008 increased and during 
these years Norway experienced a period of high economic growth(Ministry, 2010-2011 
p.18). This was especially true in the construction sector(Olsen, 2013 p. 60-61), which also is 
a sector where many labour immigrants from the Eastern EU-countries would be seeking 
employment(UDI, 2000-2011). Consequently the transition rules applied in 2004 and 2007 
did not play a very crucial role in limiting the labour immigration from EU(Holmøy, 2013 p. 
74). This obviously begs the question that the decision to impose temporarily restrictions was 
more a political decision rather than an actual concern that increased labour immigration 
would destabilize the labour market in Norway(Kvist, 2004). In 2009 the transition rules 
toward the EU8 was abolished and in 2012 the final labour restrictions toward Bulgaria and 
Romania was lifted. From here on all labour immigrants from EU are only required to fil lout 
a simple registration at the police station if they are planning on staying in Norway for longer 
than 3 months(sosialdepartementet, 2012). 
 
2.4.2 Labour immigration in Norway between 2004 and 2013 
The impact on the labour market:  
The first evident sign of change in the labour patterns in Norway are visible in 2006, two 
years after the 2004 EU enlargement. Labour immigration has between this decade become 
the prime reason why people immigrate to Norway, and have surpassed both family reunion 
and refugees. There was a growth from 139 365 labour immigrants in the last quarter of 2002 
to 333 979 in the last quarter of 2012.  During 2004 and 2008 employment among all 
immigrants increased with 7 % in comparison with only a 3 % in the general population of 
Norway(Olsen, 2013 p.56-61). The increase of economic active immigrants have 
compensated heavily for the stagnation in economic activity among the majority population. 
In the years between 2007 and 2012 there was a stagnation of 16 000 employees from the 
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general population, mostly due to old age, while simultaneously there was an increase of 
121 000 immigrants in the labour markets(Olsen, 2013 p.57-58). The decade after the EU 
2004 enlargement, immigrants have come to constitute around 10, 9 % of the total employed 
population in Norway , 2 517 000 per 2010(Ministry, 2010-2011 p. 19). In 2004 the majority 
of the EU labour immigration was short-term work permits, where most of them endured up 
to 3 months(UDI, 2000-2011 report 2004, p.12). The short-term labour immigration is 
dominated by citizens from the Eastern European  EU-countries as well as the Nordic 
countries(Ministry, 2012-2013 p.20 ). However in 2005 there was a clear trend that many 
labour immigrants from the EU, chose to apply for an extended work permit and stay up to 6 
months or more in Norway(UDI, 2000-2011 report 2006 p. 11). Statistically it is difficult to 
find an accurate numbers on all labour immigrants that have been in Norway shorter than 6 
months, as they are not registered residents.  
Who are they?   
Immigration from Eastern EU-countries have had the strongest growth of all labour 
immigration to Norway during the ten year period 2002-2012 from around 7 200 to 89 490 in 
2012. Labour immigrants in general and especially from Eastern EU-countries, are mostly 
male in their most economic active life-period, between the ages of 20-45. Still there has also 
been a slight increase in family reunification from the EU-area during the decade of growing 
labour immigration. Unsurprisingly labour immigration from Eastern EU-countries affected 
the number of economic active immigrants in Norway, and it went from 6, 1 % to 13 % 
between 2002 and 2012.  Polish labour immigrants are the definitive largest group among all 
economic active immigrants in Norway, going from relatively low 3 784 in 2002 to 51 000 in 
the end of 2012. Labour immigration from Lithuania has also been very remarkable, 
increasing rapidly from 2002 where it was more or less non-existent with only 325 labour 
immigrants, to 18 200 in 2012 where it became the third biggest group of employed 
immigrants. The extension of EU-membership to Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 did not cause 
a large flow of labour immigration, and there was only a 15 % increase between 2007 and 
2008 from these countries(Olsen, 2013 p. 60-61). After the transition rules were abolished, 
first in 2009 and then in 2012, labour immigration from Eastern EU-countries following the 
same trend as described above here has continued to increase rapidly. There is also a very 
strong presence of labour immigration from other Nordic countries, but these numbers are not 
found in the labour immigration statistics here. The Nordic citizens are unlike other EEA
i
 
members exempted from the general rules on residence permit and registration, making it 
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hard to find one complete source of information. However the available numbers show that 
the labour immigration from Nordic countries during this decade have also been on the rise, 
but that it is not as radical as the increase from Eastern European countries(Ministry, 2012-
2013 p.20 ).  
The financial crisis in 2008 and the labour market 
With the financial crisis in 2008 the number of new labour immigrants in some sectors were 
somewhat reduced in 2009. However unlike in other European countries in Norway many 
Eastern EU-citizens stayed and registered themselves as job seekers when there were cutbacks 
in their sector of employment. As a consequence the unemployment level among EU-citizens 
from Eastern Europe in Norway more than doubled between 2008 and 2009. The 
unemployment was highest among those who arrived last to Norway, and highest among men 
since they are the ones more likely to be employed in exposed sectors. However there still 
existed a demand for skilled and higher qualified labour in petroleum, shipping and higher 
education that lead to a more pronounced increase of foreign labour than there had been in 
2008. All in all there is no doubt that there was a decrease in labour immigration from EU this 
year, but due to the new registration practices that came into force in the end of 2008 and the 
continued need for labour in some sectors, it is difficult to really establish what effect the 
financial crisis had on labour immigration from EEA in Norway(UDI, 2000-2011 report 2009, 
p. 34). No later than in 2010 together with the recovery of the Norwegian economy, was there 
a new record of labour immigrants arriving in Norway. In 2012 there was a small reduction of 
approximately 4 %, but still the labour immigration was one of the highest ever recorded, and 
close to 90 % were from Europe and 2/3 of these from Eastern EU-countries (Ministry, 2012-
2013 p. 18) 
 
 
Figure 2.1 
Number of employed immigrants 
from the EU, USA, New Zealand 
and Australia that have a 
registered address in Norway, 
from 2002-2012 in the age 15-
74(SSB, 2014b). 
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Figure 2.2 
 
Employed immigrants 
between 15-74 years 
old, according to their 
world region of origin: 
The numbers are from 
last quarter of 2002 
until last quarter of 
2012, and show a 
percentage of all 
employed immigrants in 
Norway (Olsen, 2013 
p.60) 
 
 
 
Labour immigration on a regional level in Norway 
Traditionally immigrants in Norway have been prone to settle down in central regions 
(Høydahl, 2013 p.9-10). Oslo and the local municipalities surrounding the city is still the 
areas with the highest concentration of immigrants in Norway, but after labour immigration in 
2004 we now have local municipalities all over Norway where there is a high concentration of 
immigrants in percentage of the total population. Of the total number of immigrants in 
Norway per 2012; 23 % is keeping residency in Oslo while 11 % are spread out in other 
regions of Norway. There is a very strong link between the nationality of the immigrants, and 
whether they decide to reside in a city or a densely populated area or rather in a more deserted 
area. The trend shows that there are in general immigrants from outside of Europe that is most 
prone to settle down in the very centralized areas of Norway. After 2004 and onwards labour 
immigrants became one of the prime group of immigration, and naturally the demand for 
labour has become a much more decisive factor when studying what regions immigrants 
choose to reside in Norway(Høydahl, 2013p. 11-12). As a consequence of the increased 
labour immigration from EU after 2004, immigrants have become much more evenly 
distributed across regions, and there are only three local municipalities that did not have any 
labour immigrants by the beginning of 2012; Fedje and Modalen in Hordaland County and 
Lavangen in Troms. In 2012 the number of refugees were 1, 8 % compared to 2, 4 % labour 
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immigrants, and in contrast there are 93 local municipalities that did not have any 
refugees(Østeby, 2013 p. 20-22). The Eastern Europeans tend to live more scattered around in 
different regions and counties than other types of immigrants
4
, but still they live more 
centralized than the general population in Norway. Among the Lithuanians there are only 8 % 
living in Oslo, compared to 12 % of the total Norwegian population living in Oslo. The past 
years Lithuanians have become present in 395 of Norway’s 430 local municipalities, and in 
43 local municipalities they are also the largest nationality of all immigrants. Polish 
immigrants are present in 414 local municipalities, while 17 % of them are living in Oslo and 
they have become the largest nationality among the immigrants in 211 of the local 
municipalities(Høydahl, 2013 p. 9.16). The Polish immigrants tend to be especially dominant 
in the Southern regions of Norway, where they are present in 88 local municipalities 
compared to only 16 in the north of Norway. The strongest presence is found in the 
southeaster county of Buskerud and the regions West of Norway, and the lowest in the 
northern counties Finmark and Troms(Østeby, 2013 p. 23-24). In 2012 Polish immigrants 
were the largest nationality of all immigrants in 16 of Norway’s 19 counties, the exceptions 
being Troms and Finmark(Østeby, 2013 p. 23-24). There is also a strong presence of 
immigrants from Western EU-countries in the outskirts areas of Norway, and then especially 
Germans and Netherlander. They are even more prone to live in very densely populated areas 
than the Lithuanians and Polish immigrants. The coastal areas activity of fishing, fish farming 
and manufacturing of fish industries make them a target for labour immigrants, maybe 
especially among those from Eastern Europe. There is a therefore a higher concentration of 
labour immigration in surrounding central areas in Rogaland and in the West of Norway, 
unlike Agder and counties in the South-Eastern region, Trøndelag region and counties in 
North of Norway(Østeby, 2013 p. 21-23). In 1998 there were 9 nationalities that peaked 
among the total immigration population in Norway; Vietnam, Sri Lanka, Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Turkey, Pakistan, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Great Britain. The percentage of 
these groups still prevails today, but due to the enormous increase from Eastern Europe EU-
countries Poland is now by far the largest nationality followed by Lithuania in several regions 
of Norway (Østeby, 2013 p. 23-24).  The Nordic labour immigrants are usually concentrated 
heavily in the areas geographically close to their home-country borders or in the Oslo 
area(Høydahl, 2013p. 9-16). 
                                                     
4
 Immigrants tend to live more centralized in cities or densely populated areas than the general population. 20% 
of the general population live in more deserted areas while only 11 % of the immigrantsHØYDAHL, E. 2013. 
Innvandrere i bygd og by Samfunnsspeilet 2/2013, 9-16.. 
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The more even and scattered distribution of immigrants after 2004 to the different regions of 
Norway has important implications for the process of centralization. There has been a clear 
trend since the post-war period, toward a centralization of the population in Norway; 
Norwegians prefer to reside in cities or more densely populated areas. Despite these strong 
flows of centralization, the new labour immigration from Eastern EU countries have actually 
in some local municipalities managed to keep the population up. Between 1970 and 2005 
there were around 200 local municipalities where the inhabitants decreased and 200 local 
municipalities where there was an increase in number of residents. However after 2006 there 
are now 300 local municipalities that thanks to immigration have had an increase in the 
number of residents. Furthermore there has been a clear increase of inhabitants in all the 
regions from 2008 to 2012, and eight of them
5
 would have suffered a loss in the number of 
residents if they had not received a surplus from immigration(Østeby, 2013 p.23-25).  
 Figure 2.3 Number of employed immigrants, from the EU, USA, New Zealand and Australia with a registered 
address, divided up according to the 7 regions in Norway; Agder/Rogaland, Hedmark/Oppland, South-East of 
Norway, West of Norway, Trøndelag and North of Norway (SSB, 2014b)
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2.5 The Norwegian welfare state and the coordinated social security rights 
What social security benefits are most “popular” among immigrants 
With the 2004 EU enlargement and the arrival of the first labour immigrants from Eastern 
EU-countries in 2004, speculations on what welfare benefits might be attractive to these 
immigrants began. In 2005 SSB carried out a rapport where they compared the use of social 
security among the newly arrived and the labour immigrants that had arrived in 2004. In 2005 
there was an increasing use of family benefits connected to children. It is likely to believe that 
the number of welfare recipients among the labour immigrants from Eastern EU-countries 
will increase after some time when they are more familiar with the Norwegian national 
insurance scheme. However considering that their objective for immigrating to Norway is 
finding employment, certain social security benefits will most likely remain low among this 
group compared to other immigrants or the general population in Norway. On the other hand, 
there will be phases of recessions or unemployment, where one can expect an increase in 
recipients from Eastern EU countries. There is a strong tendency that the likelihood of 
receiving certain social security benefits increases with the time period one has been a 
resident together with one’s age(NOU, 2011 p. 227-28). With the labour immigrants from 
Eastern EU-countries being relatively young and only here for a short period of time, during a 
decade of high economic activity in Norway, there is no surprise that the number of Eastern 
EU-citizens in figure 2.1 receiving “Rehabilitation services and benefits” and “Disability 
pension” in 2009 are generally low compared to the other groups of immigrant recipients of 
welfare in the model.    
Figure 2.4  Løwe (2011 p.47) 
 
Welfare benefits in kroners All Nordic Western EU Eastern EU Eastern Europe Asia + Turkey Africa Other 
Rehabilitation services and benefits 5 576       5 295        2 253              1 431              9 331                  7 450                   5 792          4 679       
"Engangsstønad" with birth/adoption 513          116           142                 258                 399                     702                      1 150          453          
"Overgangsstønad og stønad til barnetilsyn" 1 606       595           253                 367                 1 511                  1 496                   5 544          1 760       
Child allowance 6 003       4 890        3 548              6 518              5 228                  6 658                   7 492          5 517       
Retirement pension 373          331           152                 54                   838                     518                      146             404          
"Dagpenger" when unemployed 5 706       4 207        4 440              9 167              5 243                  4 925                   6 183          4 056       
Sick allowance 7 775       9 818        6 297              5 521              10 905                8 397                   5 952          6 744       
Cash benefit in connection with child birth 4 157       7 795        5 346              3 646              3 942                  3 285                   2 700          6 255       
Benefit for education to single parents. 19            -           -                 -                  36                       15                        44               -           
Cash benefit "kontantstøtten" 1 387       573           484                 1 590              1 147                  1 691                   2 101          1 018       
Disability pension 1 721       934           364                 260                 2 482                  3 127                   1 481          681          
"Kvalifiseringsstønad" 43            -           1                     -                  48                       67                        121             -           
Poor relief 4 522       1 043        423                 502                 4 679                  6 403                   12 302        1 754       
Living allowance 1 862       280           136                 204                 1 983                  2 526                   5 420          776          
Introduction support/program for new immigrants. 2 473       9               14                   24                   1 630                  3 883                   8 070          74            
Total amount per immigrant region 43 870     36 001      23 896            29 595            49 539                51 268                 64 856        34 356     
Total amount per individual immigrant. 91 043     83 971      71 544            65 621            96 720                96 774                 118 048      78 996     
Per immigrant, after region of origion in kroners. 
Immigrant recipients of welfare in 2009. 
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Coordinated social security and export of welfare to other EEA-countries 
Export of Norwegian welfare benefits to foreign EEA citizens located outside of Norway, is 
found to have had a solid increase the last couple of years. When addressing the reach of the 
Norwegian welfare state abroad, there are three different types of situations where people can 
be eligible for receiving welfare benefits abroad. The first one is people that are Norwegians 
by birth living abroad; the second one is “foreigners” with a Norwegian national insurance 
number; and thirdly “foreigners” with a D-number meaning that they had more of a short term 
residency in Norway. With my focus for this thesis being labour immigration from EU after 
2004 and onwards, my concern will be with category number two and three. The exports of 
welfare benefits are regulated by national law and EU’s coordinated social security schemes 
and other bilateral agreements(NOU, 2011 p. 245). The coordinated social security schemes 
allow export of social security benefits between states within the EEA area. As a main rule 
export is applicable to all national social security benefits, unless there are sufficient(NOU, 
2011 p. 09) arguments to why it should not be exported. One of these few exceptions where 
potential receivers are limited to those with formal status as citizens are benefits linked to 
poor relief; welfare benefits given to individuals in unusually challenging situations(NOU, 
2011 p. 117). Poor relief is only extended beyond citizenship in emergency situations when 
the Norwegian state is obliged by international treaty to offer assistance. All EEA-citizens are 
entitled to remain on Norwegian territory freely up to 3 months without any form of approval, 
and up until 6 months when they are actively looking for employment. There is a demand that 
the EEA-citizens are able to support themselves while remaining on Norwegian territory, but 
in case of emergency they are also entitled to necessary emergency assistance(NOU, 2011 p. 
146-7). The international section of NAV had from 1998-2008 an increase in their amount of 
exported benefits from 2, 2 billion kroner to 4, 3 billion kroner (measured in 2008-kroners)
67
. 
Norwegian welfare benefits are fixed accordingly to Norwegian prices and income levels, 
which are known to be relatively high compared to most other countries in Europe, regardless 
of where they are disbursed(NOU, 2011). Meaning that spending them abroad will often give 
one a higher purchasing power than what was actually intended. This imbalance could 
                                                     
6
 Unfortunately I did not find more up to date numbers on the amount of exported social security benefits, than 
those reported in the report from NOU(2011) 
7
 In 2012 NAV reported a total of 344 billion kroner of welfare benefit expenses, an increase of 11 % since 2003.   
When this amount is adjusted in according to changes in income levels, benefit rates and the “grunnbeløp(G)”, 
and measured agains the level of employment there has actually been a decrease of 4 % in welfare benefit 
expenses(measured per employee in fixed expenses (Bjørnstad, 2013).  
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undermine the legitimacy of the welfare state itself as citizens with residency in Norway 
might experience this to be discriminating(NOU, 2011 p. 28). In 2008 around 34 % of those 
receiving exported welfare were foreigners with a so-called D-number
8
, 23 % were foreigners 
with Norwegian insurance number and 43 % were Norwegians by birth. The recipients with a 
D-number did in average only receive 0, 6G compared, the foreigners with insurance number 
in average received 1G and Norwegians by birth received in average 1, 6 G
9
. The majority of 
the exported benefits are still recipients located in the Nordic countries, but the number of 
recipients located in Central Eastern European(CEE) EU states were more than doubled 
between 2004 and 2008(NOU, 2011 p. 28). Still the amount of exportable benefits directed at 
the recipients in the CEE EU-member states is in 2008 relatively minor and constitutes only 1 
% of the total expenditures that are exported abroad(2011:7, 20011 p. 249). With the 
traditionally temporary nature of labour immigration, it is reasonable to believe that most 
labour immigrants will prefer to spend the majority of their earnings in their home country. 
This is especially true in situations where the family of the labour immigrant remains 
residents in their home country(NOU, 2011 p. 262).  
 
                                                     
 
 
8
 Foreigners that are employed in Norway will need a D-number if they are to receive saleries and pay taxes. The 
difference between D-number and a national insurance number is that the D-number is usually given to those 
that are here on a limited amount of time and national insurance number is given to foreigners that have more 
long term residence in Norway.  
 
9
 “G” is used when we are refering to “Grunnbeløpet i folketrygden” in Norway, this is an amount that is 
determined by the Parlament (Stortinget) in Norway, and are regulated after normal income level one or multiple 
times each  year. This amount is a starting point when calculating most social security transfers. In 2004 1G was 
around 58 139 kroner, in 2006 62 161 kroner, in 2008 69 107 kroner and in 2013 84 204 kroner(Nav, 2013a) 
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Figure 2.5 Total expenses from NAV international, 2004-2008, organized after region, million kroners and 
nominal value(2011:7, 20011 p.250).  
All welfare states have a superior goal to achieve a certain effect on individuals and society as 
a whole. The exportability of welfare benefits obviously brings up new challenges concerning 
Norwegian welfare state’s ability to achieve its superior goal and thereby indirectly 
questioning its legitimacy(NOU, 2011 p. 09). Two very defining and important objectives of 
the Norwegian welfare state are “equal opportunity” and “activation”. The first one is linked 
to the principle of universalism, ensuring that all citizens have the equal opportunity to 
participate in the society even if they are unable to sustain themselves through employment. 
Secondly the welfare benefits should always be at a level that makes employment more 
attractive. Most social benefits are taxed in Norway according to income and the indirect 
taxes on goods and services that the benefit is supposed to cover. Unfortunately as a result of 
the much higher income and  price levels in Norway compared to other European countries, 
especially the Eastern European ones, the exportability of welfare benefits might have the 
unintended effect of undermining these goals and it might even in some cases have the quite 
opposite effect. Too beneficial benefits can make the labour market less attractive for 
some(NOU, 2011 p. 262).   
Next I will take a look at some of the main social security benefits in Norway relevant to 
employment, and how they are affected by the coordinated social security schemes of EU and 
the increase in number of labour immigrants from EEA
10
 after 2004.  
                                                     
10
 If nothing else is specified the use of the term European Economic area (EEA) states should normally be 
interpreted as all states that through EU law or other bilateral agreements have access to and are obliged to 
follow EU law on the internal market. 
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Figure 2.6 The number of welfare recipients abroad; expenses from NAV international that have been exported 
abroad between 2004-2008, values in million kroners, nominal values(NOU, 2011 p. 249) 
 
1) Family welfare benefits:   
Family welfare benefits like “engangsstønad”, child allowance, cash benefit and parental 
benefits are disbursed to everyone that fulfils certain qualifications and are all exportable 
within EEA according to the coordinated social security regulation(NOU, 2011 p. 127-30). 
The export of family benefits, and especially the cash benefit has been highly controversial in 
Norway the last decade(NOU, 2011 p. 255). Child allowance, cash benefit and 
“engangsstønad” are all tax-free transfers, and the child allowance is the most significant of 
these three among the majority population and immigrants from Europe(NOU, 2011 p. 215).  
Families of EEA labour immigrants in Norway can be eligible for export of child allowance 
and cash benefit in situations where one of the child’s parents remains with the child in their 
country of origin and are unemployed. Child allowance is a benefit given to families with 
children up to the age of 18.  If the family is receiving child allowance from another national 
insurance scheme in EEA, Norway will most likely due to the higher welfare benefits in 
Norway than in most other EEA countries be exporting child allowance to cover the 
difference between the two national insurance schemes. In several EEA countries the child 
allowance is means tested, and in cases where one are not entitled to child allowance in one 
EEA country due to the fact that the family has surpassed a certain income level, the family 
can still be eligible for full child allowance from the Norwegian national insurance scheme. 
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However when neither of the parents are unemployed it is the child’s country of residency 
which determines if they are eligible for this benefit(NOU, 2011 p. 114).  
The Cash benefit is disbursed to families where the child/children in the age 1-2 years old are 
not placed in a kindergarten. Making it possible for one of the parents to stay out of 
employment and care for the child(NOU, 2011 p. 114). Between 2004 and 2008 the combined 
expenditures on export of this benefit to other EEA countries was between 18 to 27 million 
kroner. In 2008 the exported expenditures of this benefit was 2 % of the total amount of cash 
benefit disbursed by the Norwegian state to families. The first EEA export was in 2003 and 
the foreign recipients increased rapidly after this, something that is interesting also because it 
happened during a time when the national use of the cash benefit decreased considerably. 
After 2006 the recipients of cash benefit changed from being dominated by Norwegian 
citizens working abroad (54%) and Nordic citizens (41%), mostly Swedish, to being 
dominated by recipients from the new EU countries in the East - 52% in total and 88 % of the 
eastern recipients being Polish. (NOU, 2011 p. 56).  
“Engangsstønad” is not so relevant to the coordinated social security schemes, so I will end 
this section by briefly mentioning parental benefit, which are given to parents after they have 
become parents by birth or adoption. The benefit requires a minimum of 6 months 
employment the last ten months, and one are entitled to 100 % income reimbursement the 46 
weeks one are caring for the child.  All EEA citizens are entitled to this benefit on equal terms 
as Norwegian citizens, and it is also possible to add working hours from a previous 
employment in another EEA country with a later employment in Norway to fulfil the 
requirement(NOU, 2011 p. 139-40)  
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Figure 2.7  
Exported family cash benefit, or so-called “kontantstøtte” from December 2004 to December 2013, organized 
according to the recipient’s citizenship. In order to simplify the model I have divided it up into three categories 
Western EU-countries (except Scandinavia), Easter EU countries Nordic-countries (except Norway) and at last 
Norway. The model shows the number of recipients of “kontantstøtte” (NAV, 2013) 
 
2) Unemployment benefits:  
Unemployment benefits, so-called “day allowance” is an allowance that are supposed to 
partly make up for lost income as a consequence of 50 % or more unemployment. Labour 
immigrants from EEA are required to have had a full time job in 16 weeks the previous year 
or 32 weeks the 3 last years. EEA citizens that become unemployed in Norway are allowed to 
apply for a transfer of contribution time/amount from previous employment in another EEA-
country to fulfil the requirements mentioned above. In order to be eligible for a transfer of 
contribution time/amount in connection with “Day allowance”, one are required to have 
worked full time at least 8 of the last 12 weeks and have embarked on employment within the 
first 12 weeks after they arrived in Norway. When transferring contribution earned from 
employment in another EEA country, one also factors in whether they would have been 
entitled to “Day allowance” if the unemployment happened outside of Norway. To receive 
“Day allowance” one are usually expected to remain within the Norwegian territory. However 
the coordinated social security allows for an export of “Day allowance” up till 3 months in 
another EEA country while one is applying for new employment outside of Norway. 
Moreover export is also available in situations where one are about to start one’s own 
business or if one have employment in Norway but still are able to keep permanent residence 
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in another EEA country(Nordic citizens living close to the Norwegian border often commute 
to Norway). At last export of “Day allowance” require in all situations mentioned above, that 
one are 100 % unemployed and has been actively involved in finding a new employment the 
last 4 weeks of their stay in Norway(NOU, 2011 p. 138) .  
3) Sickness and disability benefits   
The temporary residency of most labour immigrants from CEE EU-countries in Norway 
together with the relatively “newness” of labour immigration from these parts of Europe, 
makes it unsurprising that there also is very low export of disability pension. Disability 
pension also require that one has been a member of the national insurance scheme of Norway 
a minimum three years(NAV, 2014).   
 
4) Retirement pension benefits 
Retirement Pension benefits were made exportable by the national social security law in 
Norway, and are not something that was enforced by the coordinated EU regulation. 
Irrespective of this, I would suspect that the pension benefit also is worth discussion as most 
labour immigrants usually tends to return to their country of origin and making it highly likely 
that the benefit will be exported. We can see from figure 2.5 that the majority of all welfare 
benefits exported abroad is retirement pension; therefore it is no surprise that there are so low 
numbers of welfare expenditure being exported to the CEE countries per 2008 as described in 
figure 2.4. The labour immigrants from CEE EU-countries are in general male individuals 
between the ages of 25-45 arriving in the period from 2004 (Olsen, 2013 p. 56-61). 
Consequently they are well below the national pension age in Norway, which are between 67 
years (62 years if accumulated enough pension rights) and 75 years. Retirement pension are 
rights that are earned over time through employment, and most likely a generous pension will 
require an even longer contribution time after the Norwegian pension reform in 2011. Usually 
labour immigrants have more of a temporary employment relation in Norway, and unless 
there is an abrupt change to more long term residency in Norway their average pension 
benefits from their employment in Norway will be relatively low compared to the majority 
population in Norway(NAV, 2014). In 2012 around 37 000 or 5, 1 % of all senior citizens 
receiving retirement pension from the Norwegian welfare state were living abroad, and the 
majority has a residency in the Nordic countries and  USA (NAV, 2012a). These numbers 
also entails the Norwegians that have emigrated abroad(NOU, 2011 p. 251-55). The pension 
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benefit as all other welfare benefits from Norway, are regulated by the high-cost levels in 
Norway and if the difference between Norway and the home country of the labour immigrant 
is major enough, one can actually receive a very lucrative pension despite  only having been 
employed in Norway for a relatively short period of time(NOU, 2011 p. 246). Retirement 
pension is not a welfare right connected to membership in the national insurance scheme in 
Norway, and was therefore supplemented by a so-called “kildeskatt” from 2010. This ensures 
that all retirement pensions are taxed equally within EEA, even though the recipients are 
living abroad and no longer are members of the national insurance scheme in Norway(NOU, 
2011 p. 260)In 2007 the average of all retirement pension exported abroad was around 1G, 
while the pension distributed to citizens within the territory of Norway was around 2, 3 G. 
(NOU, 2011 p. 251-55).The new labour immigrants from Eastern Europe will not be evident 
until later when they have reached retirement age(NOU, 2011 p. 05).  
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3.0 Theoretical framework 
The power-resource theory has long been one of the traditional approaches in the social 
science literature, when trying to understand the development of the welfare state, their 
differences and their legitimacy. Before I continue on with the theoretical framework 
described in the paragraph above, I will briefly discuss the power-resource theory and how 
come it is not a good fit for the research question in this thesis.   
The intention of this thesis is to study the impact of EU’s coordinated social security schemes 
on the legitimacy of the welfare state in Norway, in the context of EU enlargements to the 
east and increased labour immigration. With solidarity often being an important argument 
when trying to explain the distinctive character of the Scandinavian welfare, it seems logical 
to study the levels of general trust in Norway after the EU enlargements in 2004. I will 
therefore use a theoretical approach within the path dependency tradition, to better understand 
how the coordinated social security schemes affect the levels of general trust and how general 
trust affects the legitimacy of the welfare state. 
I will use social capital theory to explain why people are people are willing participate in 
collective efforts, supporting collective interest rather than their own self-interest.  
Finally I will use boundary-structuring theories to discuss the importance of territorial and 
functional membership boundaries, in generating the most beneficial conditions for collective 
efforts and general trust(Ferrera, 2005).   
 
3.1 The power –resource theory  
This theory claims that the economic position of the individual is what determines the level of 
support toward welfare expenditure.  In the power-resource model the welfare state is purely a 
product of distributive conflicts among class-based actors, and it is the relative power of these 
actors that is significant for the policy outcome. In contrast to those in the high-income 
spectrum, the low-income individuals are more likely to favour redistribution, and therefore 
support a more generous welfare state spending. The power-resource model will only expect a 
change in attitude toward social expenditures when people’s economic position change (Eger, 
2010 p.205-206). Esping-Andersen (1990), concludes that most of the Western European 
welfare states hold some form of de-commodifying effect, which gives the citizens the option 
of freely opt out of work without the potential loss of job, income or general welfare (Esping-
Andersen, 1990 p.21-23). In the power-resource theory the degree of de-commodification is 
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determined by domestic factors like the nature of class mobilization, class-political and 
coalition structures and the historic legacy of regime institutionalisation. The welfare states in 
Scandinavia have very high legitimacy among all social strata and a very high degree of de-
commodifying effect. From the power-resource theory this can be explained by the historical 
preconditions beneficial to broad coalition building during the institutionalization of the 
welfare states in Scandinavia (Esping-Andersen, 1990 p. 21-23). Moreover the power 
resource model argues that the reason why the Scandinavian welfare states have managed to 
obtain this high degree of support despite changing economic development and social 
stratification; is by extending the income replacement to the growing newer middle class that 
appeared during the 1960 and70s(Esping-Andersen, 1990 p.47).  According to the power-
resource model, the incentive of more well-off individuals to support the social insurance 
offered by welfare provision, is that they favour the safety net of having a welfare state (Eger, 
2010 p. 206). In the Scandinavian case the welfare benefits are generous in the sense that 
welfare have high quality services (education, health etc.), the social security transfers are 
calculated according to contribution in addition to a universal minimum standard and they 
cover a very wide selection of services throughout citizens life. The majority of individuals in 
Scandinavia can therefore expect to benefit from the welfare state at one point or another. The 
power-resource model concludes that people’s motive for supporting welfare provisions are 
purely out of self-interest, and that the final design of the welfare state is determined by the 
compromise between the strongest self-interests in the society(Esping-Andersen, 1990). The 
power-resource model is limited in the sense that it only implies that people’s attitudes toward 
welfare expenditure will change with their economic position. In Scandinavia the support of 
the welfare state has remained high among the majority of the population, regardless of 
individual factors like socioeconomic or political party affiliation. Additionally in the event of 
recessions or increased public spending in welfare, the legitimacy of the welfare state has 
usually remained stable in Scandinavia. From a power-resource perspective it would make 
sense to believe that these factors could create more calls for welfare revaluation or even 
retrenchments – or at least create a greater gap in attitudes between the more well-off and the 
less well-off (Øverbye, 2000 p. 9-11). 
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3.2 Path-dependency theory:  
“ Institutions are social forces in their own right”(Rothstein, 1998 p.141). 
Path-dependency theory argues that social norms can be explained by the manner in which 
political institutions structure the decision-making process, faced by actors and thereof 
influence the trust between the actors. The variation in norm governed behaviour, and the 
differences in the norms between societies can thus be traced to the design of political 
institutions(Eger, 2010 p. 206). After the institutionalization of institutions, the institution will 
reinforce itself by reproducing and supporting the norms of its foundation. Scholars of the 
path-dependency tradition therefore find that this self-reinforcing sequence, makes it difficult 
to dismantle or change institutions  even though individuals’ preferences might modify or 
change over time and despite alternative options appearing more efficient(Mahoney, 2000 p. 
508). According to Mahoney (2000 p. 515) “the institution reproduction will persist despite 
the absence of the forces responsible for their original production”. From this line of 
argument the effect of labour immigration on levels of general trust – and potentially the 
legitimacy of the Norwegian welfare state; can be explained by the domestic welfare states 
ability/inability to activate quickly enough or powerfully enough on the contingent event, 
created by coordinated social security schemes and increased labour immigration after the EU 
enlargements to the east. 
The dominant theoretical frameworks used to analyse institutional reproduction in sociology 
can be categorized in terms of; utilitarian, functional, power and legitimation explanations. 
With my research question being to study the connection between general trust and the 
legitimacy of the welfare state in Scandinavia, I will focus on the legitimation 
explanation(Mahoney, 2000 p. 517). According to the legitimation explanation institutional 
transformation is a consequence of “inconsistencies in the multiplicity of cognitive 
frameworks that are predominant in society”. Mahoney (2000 p. 525), claim that these 
inconsistencies provide an opportunity for actors to adopt new subjective perspectives and 
norms concerning appropriateness. The coordinated social security schemes and the event of 
increased labour immigration from EU after 2004, created a situation where the autonomy of 
the nation state in the social realm is no longer absolute. The welfare state is historically 
linked to the political institutions of the nation state – more specifically the modern 
citizenship. It is therefore not unlikely to expect that the changing decision-making structure 
created by the coordinated social security schemes in welfare, could damage the underlying 
legitimacy of the welfare state (Ferrera, 2005). This is perhaps even truer for the case of 
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Scandinavia, where universal welfare institution has made the connection between the 
citizenship and social citizenship even more pronounced (Esping-Andersen, 1990 p.27-28).  
 
3.3 General trust and civility: Most people can be trusted” 
Higher levels of general trust are believed to reduce the perception of risk and enhance the 
incentive among individuals to participate in collective interests(Ferrera, 2005). First I will 
discuss the logic of social categorization and identification, arguing that we as social beings in 
order to feel connected tend to categorize each other into different social categories. 
Identifying with a group makes us feel more morally obliged to take part in collective 
interests that benefits the group, despite what our own self-interest might be. Theories on 
social capital argue that the interaction we have with others by participating in organizational 
life, makes us more collectivistic(Rothstein, 1998). Secondly I will discuss the radius of trust, 
and the territorial and membership function of boundaries in enhancing general trust.  
There has been a great interest in the literature to define and determine the effect of “General 
trust” on civicness. When describing the concept of “trust in others”, scholars will usually 
distinguish between two categories of trust. The first one entails a more narrow scope and 
includes more familiar others, people we know personally and is therefore called a thick or 
specified trust.  The second category of “trust in others” is a more diffuse type of trust named 
“General trust”. “General trust” concerns itself with a wider circle of unfamiliar others, and is 
often believed to be more important than specific trust. In modern society we daily interact 
with strangers, and “General trust” is the basis of reciprocity, social connectedness, peaceful 
collective action, inclusiveness, tolerance, gender equality, confidence in institutions and 
democracy itself(Delhey et al., 2011 p.786-787).General trust is an important function for 
complex societies that involves countless daily interactions between unfamiliar people. 
Higher levels of trust produce higher levels of cooperation, while wider levels of radius trust 
produces a more inclusive definition of who one defines as “trustworthy”. A wider radius of 
trust will therefore make people more inclined to connote to out-group trust rather than in-
group trust when asked the unspecified question; “Generally speaking would you say that 
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
(Delhey et al., 2011 p.792-3).  
Interaction between citizens and the political institutions and organizational life, enables trust 
to be built, trust that if they cooperate so will others. Putnam found that social capital was 
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more significant in explaining democracy’s manner of operation, than socio-economic 
factors(Rothstein, 1998 p.129). Our opinions, interests, values and ideology all influence 
political institutions and policies, but policies and institutions also influence our social norms 
and behaviour (Rothstein, 1998 p.135). According to Rothstein (1998 p.136) individuals’ 
behaviour and preferences are influenced by both their self-interest and their preference of 
common good. When the institutional structure allows for and ensure communication, the 
actors will be more inclined to support the common good even though it might not be in their 
direct self-interest. Interaction with others makes people more likely to expect that also others 
will choose the common good in favour of their own self-interest (Rothstein, 1998 p. 135-36). 
Some scholars claim that the level of general trust that the state is able to generate, is 
connected to the degree of how ethnically or religiously homogenous the population is 
(Rothstein, 1998 p.100). If people feel attracted to each other and are loyal at the micro level, 
they are much more likely to perceive collective identity and we-feeling at a macro level. We 
tend to classify each other in different social categories, social categories based on personal- 
and social identification factors, and we are more likely to prefer common good, when the 
receiver is someone one can identify oneself with or if they are not to blame for their own 
unfortunate. People that can be blamed for their own need, because of laziness or 
irresponsibility will always be perceived as less deserving than those who are not. We also 
tend to be more inclusive toward people that are likable, grateful and confirming to our 
standards or individuals that we believe are likely to contribute to the common good of the 
group in the future (Susycki and Karolewski, 2013 p.38-40). When one support public policy 
targeted at groups one can identify with, one could also argue that there are some degree of 
self-interest present. The motive for supporting collective interests targeted at groups we can 
identify with, also result from the notion that it has previously or if not immediately, then in 
the long run, could benefit oneself or someone very close to the person.  
With the complexity of the welfare state it is likely to assume that most people will only have 
more of a basic knowledge about all the welfare state’s welfare provisions and welfare 
recipients; especially in states like Scandinavia where the welfare program is very extensive. 
The media then naturally becomes an important institution impacting and communicating 
people’s and elite’s attitudes toward “most people” and more specifically different groups of 
welfare recipients. Although “the deeper influences of socialization remain stable, what may 
change is whether or not various groups of welfare recipients are thought to be belonging 
among the deserving”(Øverbye, 2000 p.23-24).   
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Variety of research has found that the Nordic countries have a distinctly higher level of trust. 
Additionally empirical evidence shows that these Scandinavian welfare states are much more 
de-commodifying than welfare states elsewhere(Esping-Andersen, 1990). According to Bergh 
and Bjørnskov (2011 p. 1-2) there are three possible ways to interpret the causality of the 
correlation between welfare state size and general trust. Some studies argue that people’s 
perception of public service bureaucrats induces trustworthiness in unfamiliar others. From 
this line of argument “general trust” is merely a product of the welfare states size, where the 
perception of fairness is extended to the wider scope of the population together with the 
increase in generosity and inclusiveness of the welfare policies. Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011 p. 
1-2), disagrees with this line of arguments, claiming on the contrary that the universal welfare 
states can be explained and sustained by a higher level of trust in the population. Thirdly the 
causality of general trust and welfare state size might possible have a reciprocal effect on each 
other (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011 p. 1-2). In conclusion Bergh and Bjørnskov (2011p. 7)  
find that there are potentially three mechanisms that can cause general trust to affect the size 
of the welfare state. When people have a higher level of general trust, they are less worried 
about and less likely to take part in major free-riding practices. Secondly this makes people 
more receptive for risk-sharing practices through pooling of resources, enabling the welfare 
states to develop and maintain fiscally sustainable. At last high general trust allowing for a 
generous and less comprehensive regulated welfare state in turn will cause more pressure on 
the public bureaucracy administrating the welfare policies. In case of foal play the 
repercussions is likely to be higher, as people expect bureaucracy to conform to the norm, 
reducing the likelihood of malfeasance. When relying on the state to handle life-cycle 
redistribution and risk-sharing; trust in the public bureaucracy is an important factor (Bergh 
and Bjørnskov, 2011 p. 6-7).  From this line of argument they conclude that “Nordic 
countries are not outliers” among the welfare states regimes, but rather ordinary cases of 
institutional choice designed by a high degree of willingness to cooperate and an inclusive 
trust radius. Although they oppose the argument that “general trust” is a result of welfare state 
size, they do not exclude the possibility that certain welfare provisions might also have had a 
positive effect on the levels of trust(Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011 p. 16-17).  
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3.4 Boundary-structuring and general trust   
 “The boundary-structuring of the welfare state was a delicate balancing act between the 
indulgence vis-à-vis the particularisation inclinations of pre-existing social categories and 
self-defeating ambitions of redistributive stretching the scope of solidarity beyond the limits 
which could be sustained by available material resources and moral reserve”(Ferrera, 2005 
p.46)” 
At last acting in the interest of a collective identity, require some sort of coercion to 
contributions and control of the contributions to the common good. This type of enforced 
solidarity can only be stable in the long term if it is exercised by a legitimate authority capable 
of regulating motives of solidarity into actions of common good and restricting potential free 
riders. Free riders or the potential of them, are problematic because they cause people to 
hesitate from contributing to the common good. Insofar the modern citizenship with its 
institutions ensuring certain political, legal and social rights, have been highly successful 
establishing solidarity on a larger scale(Ferrera, 2005 p. 206).  
State-building theories have been a classical theme for macro-historical sociology and 
political science offering many important insights into the evolution of the European nation 
states and national citizenship, and eventually the long term evolution of the welfare states. 
“More recently this approach has been given new  life through the recent scholarship on the 
EU, and the process of territorial restructuring in the wake of globalization and new regional 
and functional international regimes(Ferrera, 2005 p. 13-14)”. Ferrera (2005 p. 16) finds the 
theoretical framework and analytical insights of the Norwegian social scientist Stein Rokkan 
as a good point of departure. In Rokkan’s framework on European state- and nation building 
and eventually the development of mass democracy and welfare systems, boundaries and 
structures claim a vital role.” Boundaries are salient in the sense that they mark the social 
territories of group relations by accentuating putative moral, cognitive, affective, behavioural 
and other attributed differences between social movement participants and the web of others 
in the contested social world”. But how exactly do boundaries generating collective identities 
and the general trust that makes people willing to contribute to the common good and support 
reallocation of resources through the welfare state. The welfare states evolved out of the 
boundary-structures of the modern citizenship, as well as it became a central institution 
enhancing this exact boundary-structure since the mid-twentieth century. A very simplified 
understanding of boundaries, are that their purpose is to distinguish between insiders and 
outsiders. Boundaries in the state- and nation building have had two prime functions that can 
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be divided into a territorial- and a membership dimension. These dimensions obviously have 
different functions as well as they hold the power of revalidating each other, often making it 
hard to separate the effect of one from the other(Ferrera, 2005 p. 44-54). In the territorial 
dimension of boundaries we are dealing with physical boundaries.  The most obvious in this 
context would be the state borders and national citizenship, separating a population within a 
national terrain from surrounding populations and foreign terrain. This is the simplest form of 
marker between insiders and outsiders, and have been useful in the state’s efforts to “lock in” 
domestic actors and induce their politicization. Redirecting citizens toward a national 
authority creates a national space where citizens more effectively can form group-formations. 
Group-formations will allow them to more successfully contest domestic membership 
boundaries and demand reallocation of power-resources controlled by the political elite. 
Simultaneously the territorial boundaries can be practical in safeguarding the domestic 
resources from outsiders, creating a more reliable environment for social cooperation by 
limiting the number of actors to collaborate with. It stipulates certain limits to the vertical axis 
of who are to be included or not as a member of the group(Ferrera, 2005 p. 44-54). The 
membership dimension on the other hand is boundaries of a more symbolic nature. These type 
of boundaries have always been salient in the social citizenship, and its extension and 
institutionalization of political-, civil-, and social rights. Their enhancements have often been 
viewed in the context of the nation-building process, as a mean to enhance group-self-
perception among its citizens and indirectly strengthen their loyalty to the territorial authority. 
Moreover this group-bonding is believed to make for a much more stable environment of 
social cooperation(Ferrera, 2005 p.20), as it induces solidarity among its members and often a 
very powerful notion of members and non-members. The emotional aspects of group-bonding 
will most likely make a restructuring process of membership boundaries an ample more 
complex and contested than the restructuring of purely territorial boundaries would.  (Ferrera, 
2005 p. 44-54). Membership boundaries tend to be much firmer geographical boundaries: 
you can cross the borders into a territory as a tourist, trader or causal labourer, but you will 
find it much more difficult to be accepted as a member of the core group claiming rights of 
control within a territory (Ferrera, 2005 p.24) 
During the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century social citizenship was gradually extended to include if not the 
whole population at least the vast majority, as a natural part of their national citizenship in 
most European states(Ferrera, 2005 p.12). Social citizenship is the rights and duties bestowed 
on the members of such a citizenship. More specifically it can be divided into categories of 
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political, civil and the focus of this discussion, social rights. The collapse of the empires had 
brought about a triumph of democratization as well as an enduringly nationalism causing 
demands of social citizenship from all social strata. However it was not until after the First 
World War that national and social citizenship truly became two sides of the same coin. 
National citizenship was now a truly powerful instrument of territorial defence, and it was out 
if this boundary-structure and this specific collective interest that the welfare states evolved 
and where created to induce (Ferrera, 2005 p.54). Will the welfare state be able to generate 
instruments ensuring the willingness to contribute as well as maintaining the belief that the re-
allocation is carried out in a just manner, when that the boundary-structures of the modern 
citizenship is no longer able to control the exit and entry within the welfare state(Ferrera, 
2005 p.44).. The modern citizenship clearly generated a beneficial environment for 
institutionalizing solidarity. In continental Europe the legitimacy of the welfare state is 
typically associated with questions of solidarity and the main issue being the degree to which 
welfare redistributions are backed by patterns of solidarity(Susycki and Karolewski, 2013 p. 
38) . “The welfare state can be considered a highly articulated and specialized form of 
institutionalized solidarity, serving both efficiency and social justice solidarity. A solidarity 
that was institutionalised during the last two centuries in the wider context of the territorial 
system-building”(Ferrera, 2005 p. 45).  
The boundaries of the national citizenship were especially beneficial in the process of 
amplifying the latitude of social rights in Europe. “The alignment of national and social 
citizenship greatly contributed to regularisation of social and economic life by reducing 
transaction and information costs providing incentives for innovation at the micro 
level”(Ferrera, 2005 p.39/40). Historically the boundary-structure of social rights in Europe 
evolved very slowly compared to the political and civil rights. Social rights tend to be more 
delicate and controversial, in the sense that they touch on dilemmas of redistribution and 
reciprocity. Granting rights to more people is always costly, because it entails a larger 
distribution of power-resources, but social rights in addition also entails substance 
costs(Ferrera, 2005 p. 44-54). However the boundary-structure established from the system of 
modern citizenship reduces the stakes by clarifying who are insiders and who are outsiders. 
The boundaries of citizenship clarifies who the actors are and who the state authority with 
legitimacy can demand certain obligations from, duties that make it possible for the system to 
generate the citizenship rights it is design to distribute. This is especially important with 
regards to social rights, as the financial requirements make them even more sensitive and 
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dependent on a strict and precise correspondence between rights and duties. In  political and 
civil rights this is not always the case, and the institutions built to manage it can to a certain 
degree function despite the members lack or partial lack of commitment(Ferrera, 2005 
p.39/40). In social rights there need to be a higher moral commitment to sharing with others, 
that are not easy to activate at an individual and primary group levels(Ferrera, 2005 p. 44-54). 
The modern citizenship with its closed national territorial and membership boundaries, made 
public support for a compulsory social insurance based on flat rate or proportional 
contributions more manageable. It nationalized redistribution(Ferrera, 2005 p.39-46) and 
shaped a common identity originating from the common interests, history of rights and duties 
with regard to the citizenship. Scholars typically acknowledge that the collective identity of 
citizens in welfare states is based on a civil commitment linked to a common national 
welfare” (Susycki and Karolewski, 2013 p.7). Although the migration flows are much minor 
in today’s Europe compared to the late 19th and early 20th century, the thick boundary-
structure of citizenship spaces today generates a much more complex and difficult political 
landscape(Ferrera, 2005 p.41). Globalization, and especially the European integration, has 
prompted a creeping but constant decoupling of rights from national terrains. The territorial 
boundaries of citizenship have become much more permeable, while the possession of 
national roots has become less important as a marker of insiders and outsiders, and in 
particular as a filter for the exercise of many rights(Ferrera, 2005 p.41-43).  
 
3.5  Theorizing concepts - what affects the level of “General trust” in a society?  
 
1. Labour immigration  
Social diversity if often thought to have an effect on the trust radius, and research show that in 
mixed communities trust in one’s own race or ethnicity is usually higher than in others. In 
societies where there are high levels of diversity as well as high levels of group conflicts, 
people tend to “hunker down and withdraw into their own circle”. In contrary to this, research 
also show that when people live in larger and more diverse communities, they are likely to 
become more accustomed to the unknown and unlike others(Delhey et al., 2011 p.790). 
Research from physiology indicates that humans copy the social trust of their parents during 
their childhood and that this basic sense of trust in strangers will remain relatively stable 
throughout life. Research has found that Scandinavians have had a historically high level of 
trust compared to other nations(Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011 p. 3), and which still prevails 
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today(Delhey et al., 2011 p.790). If we are to follow the research validating the theory where 
homogeneity is positively correlated with levels of trust, we might expect the levels of 
“General trust «in some regions, mostly regions with more densely populated communities, to 
experience a decrease in “General trust” after 2004. The empirical evidence indicate a new 
trend where labour immigrants from Central- and Eastern EEA countries, unlike previous and 
other types of immigrants, are more evenly distributed between the regions and are more 
prone to locate themselves in more densely populated areas. More populated communities 
with an already high level of diversity will from this argument, most likely be less affected by 
the new labour immigration(Østeby, 2013 p. 20-22). The literature on heterogeneity and its 
effect on “General trust” is not unambiguous, and therefore I will not make any assumptions 
on the direction of the causality(Midtbø, 2007 p. 63) 
H1: Increased level of labour immigration from the EEA after 2004 and onwards might affect 
the level of “General trust”.   
H2: People’s perception of the benefit or inconvenience increased levels of immigration will 
have on their community; will affect the levels of “General trust”.  
 
2. Trade Union  
Membership in a Trade Union is a decision to join forces with others in similar life-situation. 
In order to maximize the output from in-group cooperation, there has to be a mutual trust 
among the group members that makes everyone willing to participate and limit free-riders. In 
cases where one have cultural or social structures defining the boundaries of a group, the 
loyalty within the in-group tend to be much more intense. Several studies have stated that 
collectivist culture will only create in-group trust, and although membership in a trade union 
might be a source of higher trust in others, the positive emotions like trust and sympathy are 
likely to be reserved for the members and withheld from outsiders. In-group persistence is not 
dependent on hostility or conflict with out-groups, but in-group members tend to have a 
general preference for the familiar where the social interactions among members are more 
predictable. However intragroup conflict and hostility will often occur when there is a 
competition of material resources or political power or even in cases of perceived positive 
integration, feelings that the cooperation with an out group and the lack of clear in-group 
boundaries will cause loss of identity and loyalty among the members(Brewer, 1999 p. 429-
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442). “General trust” is dependent not only on high levels of trust, but also that this 
trustworthiness is prescribed to a wider radius of “most people”(Delhey et al., 2011 p. 787).  
H3: When people are active in a Trade Union, it decreases the levels of general trust in a 
community.  
 
3. Individual socioeconomic factors:  
Economic modernization is thought to have a profound effect on people’s mind-set, because 
education and knowledge widens the cognitive horizon. Cognitive mobilization tends to erode 
parochial world views and produces a more extended notion of “most people” (Delhey et al., 
2011 p. 790). Additionally the higher levels of prosperity produced by economic 
modernization, and with it the reduction of risk elements in a society make for a more trusting 
and cooperative society.  Poverty tends to make people more risk-averse and breeds distrust 
of those they do not know. When people have no or a limited work contract or are in the risk 
of being unemployed, the economic insecurity accompanied with this might cause them to 
feel more distrusting toward “most people” (Delhey et al., 2011 p. 790). Usually the economic 
insecurity accompanied with having no or limited work contract or being unemployed is in 
this sense also likely to have a negative effect on “General trust”.  (Vrålstad, 2012 p. 20).  
Previous research on trust and life-cycles reveals that “General trust” tends to increase with 
age. It is likely to assume that this effect can be caused by underlying factors like some 
younger age groups being too young to have achieved the same level of education or the same 
level of financial stability. Additionally previous studies have found that there is a strong 
correlation between education and age, where those with more than 9-10 years of education 
(compulsory primary and secondary education) in the age group 45-66 tends to have a higher 
level of trust than those in the same age group with only 9-10 years of education or less 
(Vrålstad, 2012 p. 15-16).  
H4: Higher education level’s increases the level of “General trust” in a community.    
H5: When people are satisfied with the state of the economy the level of “General trust” will 
increase, and when they are dissatisfied it is likely to decrease.  
H6: Unemployment will reduce the level of “General trust” in a community.  
H7: Unlimited work contract increases the level of “General trust” in a community  
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H8: People in the age group of 45-66 years tend to have a higher level of “General trust” 
than other age groups.       
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4.0 Methodology, data and operationalization 
In this chapter I will present the data and the method of social science that I have applied 
when searching for empirical evidence to my research question. I will start off by discussing 
my choice of data, their characteristics, and potential issues of reliability and validity 
connected to them. Next I will present the operationalization of the dependent variables, 
independent variables and control variables. Then I will discuss the general the advantages 
and disadvantages of using quantitative methods. Finally I will introduce the design of my 
data and the method of statistical analysis, and clarify why these are beneficial for this thesis 
and this specific research question.  
 
4.1 Data  
4.1.1 Collecting and organizing the data for my analysis 
 
The data I have used for this analysis is retrieved from the European Social survey round 1-4 
dataset and SSB statistics Norway.  The observations from the ESS are survey data, and the 
survey data from Norway is provided by Norwegian social science data services (NSD).  I 
have merged the ESS survey’s and its observations from 2002-2008 together with the 
variables on labour immigration from SSB into one dataset. Out of the regional variable in the 
ESS data, the individual answers have been aggregated from an individual to a regional level 
(7 regions). Here it is also important to note that the survey sample in each time period of the 
ESS survey data are not the identical set of individuals, making the data a  “simple likelihood 
sample” of the population in Norway. The ESS survey and SSB have very strict sampling 
strategies, ensuring strong construction validity. All members of the population have the equal 
likelihood of being selected as well as the requirements ensuring that the samples are 
representative for the whole population(ESS, 2014, SSB, 2014 ). When studying change in 
society it is vital that the data is collected in a way that fulfils the principal of stable reliability 
or it will be difficult to determine when change actually occurs. Additionally it is also 
important when dealing with a large sample of individuals, like in the ESS survey, that there 
are clear directions on how to collect the data from each individual, in order to avoid loss of 
equivalence, reliability.  With both the ESS survey and the SSB being highly professional and 
well known institutions, I can be confident that the method used to collect the data makes it 
reliable (Grønmo, 2007 p.222-23).  
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With my research question studying the connection between increasing numbers of labour 
immigrants from the EU after the enlargements in 2004 and 2008, and how these might have 
affected the level of general trust in the population in Norway. It would have been ideal for 
the validity of my research if the time period of my data and analysis were yearly between 
2000 and 2013, but because of limited available data the best source is the ESS survey data 
where I will get the time periods 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008. Of course it would have been 
interesting to have had a longer time period, as other empirical sources show that the trend of 
labour immigration from EU has steadily been increasing from 2008-2012. However this was 
unfortunately not possible, mostly because the newer publications of the European social 
survey did not contain regional variables for the Norwegian respondents and also lacked some 
of the independent variables necessary for my analysis(NSD, 2002-2012). Although it is not 
ideal the data I have for my analysis, are still sufficient in the sense that they will cover the 
time periods of interest to my research question (Grønmo, 2007 p. 221).  
4.1.2 Ecological fallacy in aggregated data 
When using data that are aggregated, like here from an individual level to regional level, one 
must be aware of the ecological fallacy. Causality between certain variables can be present on 
individual level data; however this does not automatically mean that the same causality will 
exist on higher aggregated levels. Often the effect will be present on both levels, but we 
should be aware that there are certain effects that are only present on individual level (Skog, 
2004 p.110). 
 
4.2 Operationalizing  
In the operationalization I will present the variables used in the analysis; how they are 
measured and where they are “collected” from(Grønmo, 2007 p. 391). In a quantitative 
approach our theoretical definitions and assumptions must be translated into variables that can 
be tested in a statistical analysis(Grønmo, 2007 p. 128-32). It will then be important to 
consider whether the operationalization is carried out in a manner that secures the validity. 
First of all one should consider if the concept is operationally defined in a sense that it covers 
the theoretical content of the concept, or one can risk not actually measuring what one posed 
as the research question. Next the operational definitions of a concept and the hypothesis of 
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how different concepts correlate should preferably be recognised from previous 
literature(Grønmo, 2007 p.232-33). In the statistical analysis the data will be as mention 
before aggregated from an individual to a regional level, but to get a better understanding of 
the variables they will in the operationalization be described in their original form, on the 
individual level.   
  
4.2.1 The dependent variables    
My thesis is based on a theoretical assumption that general trust or solidarity is one of key 
cornerstones of the survival and popular support of the welfare state in Norway. The decision 
to use general trust as an indirect measure to explain the legitimacy of the welfare state is in 
part also a consequence of limited data in the ESS survey. I was not able to find any variables 
that measured the support of welfare arrangements or welfare spending in Norway on regional 
level in the time period of interest to my research. After thoroughly considering the relevant 
literature in the field of the welfare state, I have concluded that studying the impact of labour 
immigration on the levels of general trust will still be a valuable contribution to the literature 
on globalisation and the welfare state in Scandinavia. When discussing the level of “General 
trust” one should always assess both trust and the radius of this trust. These are considered to 
be mutually dependent and one can never compensate for the lack of one by increasing the 
other. Delhey et al. (2011 p.792-3), concludes that if people when asked the question “most 
people” are more likely to connote out-group trust rather than in-group trust we can assume 
that the radius of trust is wide. After analysing 51 countries from the fifth round of the World 
Value Survey, Delhey et al. (2011 p.792-3) finds that in 41 of the countries the respondents 
are more prone to, connote to out-group trust when asked these types of unspecified trust 
measures. Often researchers have found that discovering a clear causation between “General 
trust” and other components of civicness or social capital can be empirical challenging. 
However  Delhey et al. (2011 p.801) claims that this can largely be explained by the 
unspecified “most people” measure’s ability to capture trust radius and not only levels of 
trust. When analysing western democracies the use of the “most people” question to measure 
general trust is often less troublesome, as the level of trust radius tends to be generally stable 
and high here compared to other countries in the world (Delhey et al., 2011 p.801). 
Consequently I feel confident that the concept of general trust has high validity in the 
operationalization.   
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Most people can be trusted: This variable is retrieved from the ESS survey, where people 
are asked to place on a value scale from one to eleven, whether they find people trustworthy 
or not. Number one being “people are not to be trusted” and number eleven being “most 
people are trustworthy”(NSD, 2002-2012).  
Most people are fair: This variable is retrieved from the ESS survey, where people are asked 
to place on a value scale from one to eleven, whether they find people to be fair or not. One 
being “people won’t treat you fair” and eleven being “most people will treat you fair”(NSD, 
2002-2012).  
Most people are helpful: This variable is retrieved from the ESS survey, where people are 
asked to place on a value scale from one to eleven, whether they find people to be helpful or 
not. One being “people are not helpful” and eleven being “most people are helpful(NSD, 
2002-2012)”. 
 
4.2.2 The independent variables  
The variable of labour immigration is not a perfect measure of the number of labour 
immigrants as it only includes labour immigrants with a registered address. Usually these are 
labour immigrants that are here for minimum of 6 months or longer, and the measure does 
therefore not include more seasonable labourer that are here for less than 6 months. This was 
inescapable, as I needed a measure of labour immigration that also described the region of 
residence in Norway. However the empirical literature on the development of labour 
immigration in Norway reveals a clear trend that the labour immigrants from the EU are 
increasingly turning their stay into more long term employment. With the numbers of 
seasonable labourers from EU(less than 6 months) in decline, I feel more confident that the 
variable chosen to measure the concept of labour immigrants from EU fulfils the principal of 
definition validity in the operationalization(Grønmo, 2007 p.232-22) 
 
Labour immigrants to Norway (absolute values): 
The variable is retrieved from SSB statistics Norway, and is a metric variable measuring the 
absolute number of employed immigrants with a registered address in Norway from EU, 
USA, New Zealand and Australia from 2001-2009. The variable is divided up among 7 
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regions, accordingly to the registered address of the immigrant. When being employed in 
Norway longer than 6 months, one are required to register with an address(SSB, 2014b). This 
variable was the most appropriate one at SSB, because here I get the correct time lapse for my 
analysis and the numbers are divided up according to region. Unfortunately the variable also 
measures the number of labour immigrants from the US, Australia and New Zealand, but 
according to Olsen (2013) the absolute majority of all labour immigrants are after 2004 
individuals from EU and especially from the central- and eastern member countries. Therefore 
I do not believe the variables from USA, New Zealand and Australia will not cause too much 
problems with construction validity (Skog, 2004 p.89-90). In the analysis I have log 
transformed the variable to make it more linear, so that it will fit better with the OLS-
regression requirements.  
 
Labour immigration to Norway (relative values): This variable is based on the previous 
described variable, and is a percentage of employed immigrants with a registered address in 
Norway from EU, USA, New Zealand and Australia(SSB, 2014b). Unlike the previous 
variable this variable is measured in percentage, and additionally it is weighted against the 
total account of inhabitants in the different regions in every time period 2002, 2004, 2006, 
2008 (SSB, 2014a). There is a high variation in the population size in the 7 regions, and this 
variable allows us to get a better grasp on the amount of labour immigration and consider the 
actual extent of the labour immigration in the different regions.  
Immigration good or bad for country: The variable is retrieved from ESS survey, where 
people are asked to place on a value scale from one to eleven, whether they find immigration 
good or bad for the country. One being “immigration makes it a worse place to live” and 
number eleven being “immigration makes it a better place to live”(NSD, 2002-2012).  
 
4.2.3 Control variables 
 Membership in a Trade Union, the last 12 months: This variable is retrieved from the ESS 
survey, where the respondents are asked if they have been a member of a trade union the last 
12 months. Originally this variable had more than only two categories, but I have coded it into 
a dummy variable where the value one is “Yes” and zero is the other answers, including “NO” 
(NSD, 2002-2012).  
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Years of education: The variable is retrieved from the ESS survey, and asks the respondents 
how many years of education they have completed. The respondents are asked to report both 
full-time and part-time education, in full-time equivalents including years of compulsory 
schooling(NSD, 2002-2012). In order to fulfil the requirements of the OLS-regression I will 
be using a log transformed variety of this variable in all of my analyses.  
Year of birth/Age: The variable is from the ESS survey, and the respondents are asked to put 
in their year of birth(NSD, 2002-2012).   
Satisfied with the economy: The variable is retrieved from the ESS survey, where the 
respondents have been asked to place themselves on a scale from zero being extremely 
dissatisfied with the state of the economy in Norway and ten being extremely satisfied(NSD, 
2002-2012).  
- Used a dummy variable in the analysis  
Unemployed and jobseeker for longer than 3 months: The variable is retrieved from the 
ESS survey, and asks the respondents if they have ever been unemployed jobseekers for a 
period longer than three months. The variable is a dummy variable, where the value 1 equals 
“YES” and zero equals “NO”(NSD, 2002-2012) 
Work contract limited: The variable is retrieved from ESS survey, and the respondents are 
asked if they have a work contract that is limited or unlimited. The optional answers are 
unlimited, limited, no contract. I have coded the variable into a dummy variable where value 
one is all answers “limited” and zero is “unlimited work contract” “no contract”. (NSD, 2002-
2012).  
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4.3 Quantitative approach  
Very simplified we can argue that research design can be divided into two camps either the 
quantitative or the qualitative tradition, and for decades there have been ongoing discussions 
among political scientist of which one is the road to truth(Verba, 1994 p.3-7) However in this 
discussion I will only concern myself with why I believe a quantitative approach is the most 
fruitful for this research question. In social science we are never dealing with absolute truth, 
but rather we are looking at causal tendencies. By using a quantitative research design, one is 
able to test a very specific hypothesis over a larger sample of units, and can therefore draw 
statistical generalizations beyond the sample to a larger population. My objective with this 
thesis is to see if the level of general trust among citizens in Norway is affected by the labour 
immigration from EU after 2004. I therefore believe a quantitative method will be best suited 
for this thesis as well as manageable within the time limits set for this project. In order to 
really make any statistical generalizations on causality between variables, multivariate models 
are necessary. There are several models to choose from, but in this thesis I will be using a 
linear (King, 1986)regression analysis (Skog, 2004 p.59).  
4.3.1 Longitudinal design 
The scientific design of my quantitative study will be a so-called longitudinal design. The 
main advantage of this design is that it accounts for both time and space, by following the 
same units over a period of time (Skog, 2004 p. 69-86). “Longitudinal design have long been 
considered some of the best designs for the study of causation next to purely random 
experiments”(Menard, 2008 p.245). By comparing the same units across time it is very 
suitable for detecting changes and the nature of this change(Grønmo, 2007p. 378-79). This 
can be helpful when we are interested in the time order and the durability of a causal relation 
between dependent and independent variable. In social studies it is reasonable to believe that 
in many cases even though we do not find causal relations straight away, this does not 
necessarily mean that they are not present. Some causal relations do not manifest themselves 
straight away, and with sufficient observations across time and space longitudinal design can 
be very fruitful in detecting these connections (Skog, 2004 p. 77-78). There is however certain 
“flaws” with the longitudinal design that one needs to be aware of, and that will need certain 
corrections to avoid mistakes and problems with validity.  These flaws are autocorrelation, 
heteroskedacity and heterogeneity(Menard, 2008 p.233). When analysing the same units 
repeatedly we will most likely be dealing with serial dependency, or so-called panel 
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autocorrelation. Usually the characteristics of a unit, for example the behaviour of the 
individual, tend often to be correlated with itself from one period of time to the next(Menard, 
2008 p.237-38). Panel heteoskedacity occurs when the error variance varies across units or 
over time, due to characteristics unique to each unit. Isolated the effect may be relatively 
modest, but when adding time dimensions the effect can magnify in a manner equivalent to 
the number of time periods(Menard, 2008 p.238). Panel heterogeneity is when all the units are 
affected by a “shock” during the same time period or/and it can consist of a time-stable 
difference between the units. When all the units are affected by an event in maybe only one of 
the time periods of the panel, it can cause errors and these errors will be correlated across 
each unit(Menard, 2008 p.238). There are several statistical tests one can apply to detect for 
these “flaws” and models one can use to correct for it(Menard, 2008 p.237-38). Before going 
into detail on what these models are, I need to introduce my method of analysis.   
 
4.3.2 The multivariate linear regression model    
There are several benefits to using a multiple linear regression in social science to analyse 
cause and effect of a phenomena.  The regression line in a linear regression reports the 
statistical tendency in our data, and the standard error in the model measures how much 
variation there are among the units around the regression line(Skog, 2004 p. 220-22). The 
linear regression method assumes that a potential change in the dependent variable will be 
autonomous from the level of the independent variable. Linear regression analysis is a 
suitable method for analysing correlations between several variables, and can be helpful in 
describing the direction and strength of a correlation (Skog, 2004 p.213-14). It tells us how 
much the dependent variable in average increases or decreases when the independent variable 
increases by one value (Skog, 2004 p.217-18). The linear regression has also a measure where 
it accounts for all unknown explanatory factors that might affect the dependent variable, 
which is called the error term (Skog, 2004 p.258-61). The regression line in a multivariate 
analysis gives a more complete picture of a phenomena and the description of causality will 
be more accurate and trustworthy than in a bivariate regression. The advantage with a 
multivariate regression is that we can control for the effect of one explanatory variable on the 
dependent variable simultaneously as all the other explanatory variables are kept constant. By 
isolating the effect one explanatory variable has on the dependent variable, we can interpret 
this effect independently from the other potential relevant explanatory variables in our model. 
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A multivariate regression will thereby be helpful to determine the relevance of each 
explanatory variable on the dependent variable, and actually give a sense of how good our 
model are to explain the effect in the dependent variable. Also it can be fruitful when we want 
to get a sense of which of the independent variables that are the most relevant(Midtbø, 2007 
p. 97-99). This makes it highly relevant for my thesis, as my intention is to determine if the 
independent variable of labour immigration from EU after 2004 have any effect on the 
dependent variable of general trust and how stronger its potential effect is compared other 
control variables added in my model. 
I will need to decide what level of significance I should apply when determining to reject or 
not reject the null hypothesis. Rejecting the null hypothesis means that the impact that the 
dependent variable on the independent variable is judged to be of statistical significance. 
There are three different levels of significance (10, 5, 1), the higher level of significance the 
higher likelihood of making a Type I error, meaning that one rejects a null hypothesis that is 
in fact correct. However with very low levels of significance, the chances of making a Type II 
error will naturally be a potential. Type II errors are when we do not reject the null 
hypothesis, and it turns out that it is in fact incorrect. When testing a hypothesis one must also 
consider whether one would like to use a one-tailed or a two-tailed test. The two-tailed test 
does not have any specific perception of the direction of a potential causality; unlike the one-
tailed test where significant results exclusively will signify either a positive or a negative 
causality. In order to use a one-tailed test the theoretical assumptions must be very 
unambiguous, as the likelihood of making a Type I error doubles compared to in a two-tailed 
test. Using a two-tailed test although the literature clearly is unambiguous of the direction of a 
correlation, will be a case of unfounded caution(Midtbø, 2007 p. 62-68). When deciding on 
level of significance, one should consider the size of one’s sample. Larger samples (but not 
too large where one find significant relationships everywhere) are often more comparable to 
the population that they are actually measuring, and consequently the standard error of the 
estimate is often lower than in smaller samples. With smaller samples where the variation in 
the independent variables potentially is more homogenous, the standard errors are likely to be 
higher. With high standard errors we will often struggle with finding significant results in a 
statistical regression analysis. Since my sample after the aggregation has only 28 observations 
divided among 7 regions, my sample is a rather small. It will therefore be smart of me to 
choose the lowest level of significance in my analysis to avoid the likelihood of making Type 
I errors; rejecting the null hypothesis on false premises. With a statistical significance on 1%,  
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there will only be 1 % chance that the statistical significant results in my regression analysis 
will be a consequence of randomness (Midtbø, 2007 p. 62-68). Naturally the price of securing 
oneself from making a Type I errors is always that the likelihood of making Type II error 
increases; not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false. The likelihood of making a Type 
II error is also dependent on the size of the sample and the strength of the causality; if the 
sample is small and the variation between groups are low or the causality is weak the 
likelihood of making a Type II error will be high when choosing a strict significance level of 
1 %(Skog, 2004 p.207-08).  
 
  
4.3.3 Diagnostic for a linear regression  
The linear regression analysis requires certain conditions to be fulfilled before one can run a 
meaningful statistical analysis. 
 
1. Linearity  
 First of the assumptions of the linear regression is that the correlation between Y and X are 
more or less linear, meaning as mention above that when X increases by one unit the change 
in Y is constant no matter what the level X. After testing the linearity of my data; although 
there were no serious non-linear correlations, I found that transforming two of the 
independent variables into logarithms improves the linearity (Midtbø, 2012 p. 134-35). After 
running the statistical test Ramsey’s regression specification error test (RESET), I can 
conclude that the correlations between independent and dependent variable(s) in the three 
models “People can be trusted”, “People will treat you fair” and People are mostly helpful” 
fulfils the linearity requirements of a linear regression analysis(Midtbø, 2012  p.130-31). 
When checking the normal distribution of the error term with a histogram and a so-called 
“sktest” in Stata, I find that they improves slightly in all the models after I have transformed 
the independent variables “Labour immigration from EU” and “Years of education” into 
logarithms.  
2. The error term should be: homoscedastic normally distributed and not auto correlated. 
(Skog, 2004 p. 236-57). 
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A) Homoscedastic error term 
 Homoscedastic error term means that there is not too much variation in the observations 
around the regression line, if there are the accuracy of the model varies whether one have high 
or low values on X(Midtbø, 2012  p. 106-112). If this is not the case we are dealing with 
heteroskedacity (Skog, 2004 p. 236-57). With models where one have a large set of 
observations it might not cause much of a problem, but due to the reduced size of my dataset 
after aggregating individual data to regional data, high levels of heteroskedacity can be 
problematic and cause statistical margins of errors. One solution to heteroskedacity could also 
be to transform the variables into logarithms, go over the model again and see if there are any 
important explanatory variables left out. Alternatively one can use statistical models that 
accounts for heteroskedacity in their estimations (Midtbø, 2012  p. 106-112) like panel 
corrected standard errors model. The Breusch-pagen (BP)-test and the more alternative 
White-test confirms that there are no heteroskedacity in the error terms of the model “People 
can be trusted”, “People will treat you fair” or in the model “People are mostly helpful” 
(Midtbø, 2012  p.106-12).  
  
B) The error term: normally distributed  
The error term should be normally distributed or we can experience that it can be difficult to 
determine the statistical significance of the results from our analysis. In a good model there 
should always be an equal likelihood of both overestimating and underestimating a 
value(Midtbø, 2012  p. 114-16). However in situations where we are dealing with statistical 
outliers, meaning observations that are far from the regression line compared to the other 
observations in our model (Skog, 2004 p. 236-57), we come in danger if these outliers 
happens to be both extreme and with leverage, to over- or under predicate their 
relevance(Midtbø, 2012  p. 114-16). This condition might not be so influential if we have a 
very many observations, however if one are working with smaller datasets like me, one 
should be aware. An error term that is not normally distributed can give us skewed results, 
making it more likely to make type I or type II errors (Skog, 2004 p. 236-57). When running a 
q-plot it might look like there is an observation from the region “North of Norway” in the 
model “People can be trusted” can be an outliner, but after running additional statistical tests 
of the leverage of the outlier, I can conclude that it is not an influential outlier. In the model 
“People will treat you fair” there were some observations not placed directly on the regression 
line in the q-plot, but also here the test of influential outliers was negative. The last model 
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“People are mostly helpful” did not have any potential outliers among its observations, and I 
can therefore come to the conclusion that there are no issues with the normal distribution of 
the error term in any of my three models(Midtbø, 2012  p. 114-18).   
 
C) The error term: not auto correlated with itself or the independent variables.  
Lastly the error terms in our model should not be internally correlated or correlated with the 
independent variables. The first issue of internal correlation is a known problem in time series 
and longitudinal scientific design. Since my data is organized into a longitudinal design I am 
also dealing with time periods and it is highly unlike that the error term one year are not going 
to be correlated with the error terms for the additional time periods(Skog, 2004 p. 236-57). 
However with my units being samples of the population in Norway, I am not observing the 
exact same individuals in every time period of my longitudinal data, which decreases the 
likelihood of high autocorrelation among repeated observations (Skog, 2004 p. 328). The 
result of having internally auto correlated error term is often that the standard errors in the 
model are underestimated. The second issue where the error term is correlated with the 
independent variable, m it harder to detect the real causality. More specifically there should 
not be omitted variable bias, creating the effect in Y as well as it is correlated with X. This 
will give us a much skewed sense of the cause and effect that X has on Y. Underlying effects 
is when X take on the effect of a non-identified variable in the error term, causing too high or 
too low estimates in the model. One straight forward solution to this could be to identify and 
add more control variables to the regression model (Skog, 2004 p. 236-57). After running the 
Wooldridge test for panel autocorrelation the model “People are mostly helpful” rejects the 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation. The other two models on the other hand did not reject the 
hypothesis(Newton and Cox, 2003). Since my data being a longitudinal design and runs the 
potential of panel autocorrelation and heteroskedacity, I will apply models that corrects for 
this in my analysis(Menard, 2008 p.235).  
 
2. Multicolinarity between independent variables.  
Another issue that often arises when we are using multivariate regression is multicolinearity 
between the independent variables, causing high standard errors and increasing the likelihood 
of Type I errors. With colinearity between two or more variables it becomes difficult to 
decide the effect of individual variables on the independent variable, and thereby we are 
56 
 
56 
 
unable to predict the nature of the causal relation between the dependent and independent 
variables. There are statistical tests one can run to measure the level of collinearity, and if 
present one can try to run regression models with and without the suspected variables, to see 
if we can detect what variables are correlating(Skog, 2004 p.186-88). If the test finds high 
multicollinearity, one can try to run a factor analysis or combine explanatory variables into 
fewer variables or if possible add additional variables(Midtbø, 2012  p. 129-130). When 
running the Variance inflation factor test for multicollinearity, the results show that the 
multicolinarity is much lower than the limit of 10, between 2-3 on all three models(Midtbø, 
2012  p. 129).  
 check the individual multicolinarity in VIF  
4.3.4 Linear regression models  
In the statistical analysis I will use more than one linear OLS regression method to check the 
robustness of my results (Skog, 2004 p.207). The model I will put most faith in is however the 
OLS panel corrected standard error model, which accounts for and corrects for longitudinal 
design issues with autocorrelation and heteroskedacity(Beck and Katz, 1995 p. 634).  
A) OLS linear regression model with Random effects:  
I will be using a multivariate regression analysis together with the technique of OLS-linear 
regression (Skog, 2004 p. 222). Ordinary least square (OLS) is one of the most accurate linear 
regression methods, because it calculates the linear regression to be the “lowest sum of 
squared errors”. This means that the linear regression line is placed where the distance 
between the observed and predicted values in the model is minimal (Skog, 2004 p.222). The 
estimations from OLS are unbiased meaning that there is no systematic tendency that the 
estimate will be too high or too low. The standard error in the model is equally likely to go in 
one direction as the other, ensuring that the standard error of the estimate will not end up 
lower than the standard deviation in the population(Skog, 2004 p. 136). The OLS methods 
estimations are known for having very accurate predictions and producing low levels of 
statistic insecurity compared to many other regression estimators (Skog, 2004 p.223). “OLS is 
optimal (best linear biased) for longitudinal data when the errors are assumed to be 
generated in an uncomplicated (spherical) manner”(Beck and Katz, 1995 p. 636). When 
using an OLS model in longitudinal data, one is always in danger of having to deal with 
temporally and spatial correlated errors and heteroskedacity. In order for OLS to be optimal it 
is necessary to assume that all the error processes have the same variance (homoskedacity) 
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and that all the error processes are independent of each other(Beck and Katz, 1995 p. 636). 
One of the most traditional used solutions for this issue is to use fixed or random effects 
models. There are several considerations when choosing between a random or a fixed model; 
the size of N and T, correlation between the error term and predictors and problematic 
predictors(Menard, 2008 p.233-239).  One statistical helpful tool here can be to run the 
“Hausman” test, where the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is that there are no correlation 
between the unobserved unit-specific random effects and the regressors. If this is correct the 
Random effects model will be the best suited. After running the test the results validates that 
random effects model is the best suited option for my analysis(Menard, 2008 p.233-236).  
 
B) Panel corrected standard errors model:  
The other model that has proved itself useful when running OLS in longitudinal data is panel-
corrected standard errors. The estimates in panel-corrected standard errors can be very 
accurate, “even in the presence of complicated panel error structures” unlike the case of 
normal OLS estimates of standard errors(Beck and Katz, 1995 p. 634). Panel-corrected 
standard errors in the case of homoscedasticity and non-correlated errors perform equally 
accurate as OLS standard errors would. However in the case where there is heteroskedacity 
and contemporaneous correlation of the errors, the panel-corrected errors still performs well 
(Beck and Katz, 1995 p.641).  
 
5.0 Multivariate regression analysis 
As was discussed in the operationalizing section of the methodology chapter, I do not have a 
variable with observations reporting the direct support of the welfare state in Norway. 
However the theoretical assumptions discussed in the theoretical chapters of this thesis, 
highlights the importance of general trust to the continuance of the Scandinavian welfare 
state. The aim of this chapter is therefore to provide an empirical assessment of the theoretical 
assumptions that weakening of boundaries and an increasingly heterogeneous population 
could come to harm the levels of general trust in Norway. According to previous research 
practices the level of general trust can be measured by analysing three different survey 
questions; most people can be trusted, most people will treat you fair and most people are 
helpful (Delhey et al., 2011 p.801).  My main focus in the multivariate regression analysis will 
be on the variable “Most people are trustworthy”, but I will also add the two additional 
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dependent variables, “helpful and fair”, to provide a more balanced and amplified description 
of the perceptions of general trust in Norway. I will first present a table containing descriptive 
statistics of all the variables used in the multivariate regression analysis. In part 5.2 the 
findings from the multivariate regression analysis will be presented and discussed.  
 
5.1 Descriptive statistic  
 
Table 5.1 Descriptive statistic 
Name of variables  Min  Max Mean  
Std. 
deviation 
Observation 
Dependent variables            
  Most people can be trusted  7,25 7,97 7,68 0,17 28 
  Most people will treat you fairly 7,74 8,33 7,97 0,13 28 
  Most people are helpful  6,79 7,37 7,07 0,16 28 
Independent variables            
  Number of labour immigrants 2 751 28 702 8946,53 7133,71 28 
  Percent of labour immigrants(relative) 0,69 2,61 1,21 0,52 28 
  Number of labour immigrants(lagged)  2 703 26 032 7921,25 7041.99 28 
  Immigration good or bad for country 5,59 6,6 6 0,27 28 
Control variables            
  Years of education  12,03 14,76 13,15 0,66 28 
  Currently a trade union member  0,35 0,56 0,46 0,5 28 
  Age  1953,53 1963,76 1958,96 2,82 28 
  Dissatisfied  with economy in country 0,27 0,62 0,43 0,09 28 
  Limited work contract  0,63 0,88 0,79 0,06 28 
  Unemployed more than 3 months  0,14 0,29 0,2 0,03 28 
 
The table of descriptive statistics report very low standard deviation in almost all of the 
variables. The three dependent variables have all an average higher than 7 on a scale from 1-
10, and I can therefore conclude that the selection show a quite constant level of high general 
trust. The independent variables - with the exception of the labour immigration variable – also 
report very low standard deviation. Low standard deviation in the variables could potentially 
make it tougher to detect significant results between these independent variables and the 
dependent variables when running the statistical analysis (Skog, 2004 p.229). As expected 
from the evidence in the background chapter (chapter 2) the variable labour immigration 
containing absolute values, reports a very high standard deviation. The labour immigration 
variable containing the relative values, on the other hand, reports a standard deviation of 0, 52 
% meaning that there is not a strong variation between the regions after that the population 
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size is accounted for. The increase of labour immigrants measured against population size in 
the different regions is also very modest, with maximum being only 2, 61 %.  The 
independent variable “immigration good or bad” has an average of 6 on a scale from 1 to 11, 
and a standard deviation only being 0,27, indicating that most people in my selection are 
mutually optimistic about the effect immigration will have on the country. The average of the 
control variable “years of education” reveals that the level of education is in average very 
high among my selection. According to the theoretical assumptions the levels of general trust 
increases with the level of education, consequently the lack of significant results between the 
education variable and the dependent variable in the regression analysis might just be because 
of lack of variation and not necessarily lack of causality. The dummy variable “trade union 
member”, on the other hand has a quite high std. deviation (0, 50), as well as it is actually one 
of the control variables that occasionally reports significant results on the dependent variables 
in the regression analysis. Next the “age” variable show that the average year of birth of the 
respondents in this selection is 1958, and that the std. deviation is only 2, 82 years. With the 
theoretical assumptions claiming that people in the age group of 45-66 years tend to have 
higher level of general trust compared to other groups, it perhaps explain why the variables 
effect on the dependent variables are non-significant in the statistical analysis. The dummy 
variable “dissatisfied with the economy”, tells us that the selection in my data are in average 
more satisfied (1) with the economy than dissatisfied(0). This is also the case of the two last 
variables, «limited work contract” and “unemployed for more than 3 months”. Here the 
average and the standard deviation reports that the absolute majority from my selection have 
not had a limited work contract or been unemployed for more than 3 months. It is perhaps 
unsurprising that the selection reports such an average high economic security in the case of 
Norway. Compared to other European states Norway - as was described in the background 
chapter of this thesis (chapter 2) - could be argued to be an outlier in the case of economic 
security, due to the high economic security provided to its citizens through the welfare 
program and also the low levels of unemployment during the period of this analysis (2002-
2008). Consequently the lack of findings will not necessarily mean that the variables are non-
significant to the level of general trust, only that they are less important in the case of 
Norway.  
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Figure 5.1  
Bivariate correlations of the variables «labour immigration (weighted) and “immigration good or bad”, in all the 
7 regions 
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The seven models in figure 5.1 describes the correlation between the variable “labour 
immigration (weighted)” and the variable “immigration good or bad” in all of the 7 regions in 
Norway. The models show among others that the attitudes toward immigrants in 2002 are in 
all 7 regions on a level 5 – in a scale from 1 to 11, where 10 is the perception that immigration 
is good for the country and number one being the perception that it is not. Secondly the 
models show how these attitudes have improved slightly, but steadily, between 2004 and 2008 
reaching a level between 6 to 7 in all regions. More interestingly the models in figure 5.1 
portrays how the attitudes toward immigration improves simultaneously as the percentage of 
labour immigrants increases in all of the regions in Norway in the time period 2004 to 2008. 
In the regions Hedmark and Oppland, Northern Norway and Western Norway one can detect 
a slight drop in the attitudes toward immigration in 2004. From the theoretically standpoint of 
this thesis, this could be interpreted as the sudden and temporarily reaction to the unknown. 
As described in the background chapter these regions were regions that prior to the labour 
immigration from Eastern European EU countries did not attract much immigration compared 
to more central regions like Oslo and Akerhus(Høydahl, 2013p. 11-12). After living in larger 
and more diverse communities, this fear of the unknown usually decreases as people become 
more accustomed to the unknown and unlike(Delhey et al., 2011 p.790). This could  perhaps 
partly explain why the attitudes toward immigration also in these regions continue to increase 
steadily the year after the drop in 2004.   
 
 
  
 
5.2 The results from the multivariate regression analysis 
In this part the results from the multivariate regression analysis on the three dependent 
variables; “most people can be trusted”, “most people will treat you fair” and “most people 
are helpful” will be presented. To ensure the robustness of my results, the variables in section 
(A) and (B) will be compared in three different models; regular OLS-regression, random 
effects models and a panel corrected standard error model. In section (A) I will use an 
independent variable on labour immigration with absolute values, while in section (B) I will 
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use an independent variable on labour immigration with relative values. The relative variable 
takes into consideration the size of the population in the region and the relative importance of 
labour immigration to the size of the population in the different regions. In section C and D I 
will only be using the OLS panel corrected standard error model, this due to space limitations 
in my thesis and that this model according to Beck and Katz (1995 p. 634) has proved itself 
more robust  than normal OLS or random effects, when dealing with OLS panel data. Section 
C and D will also contain the independent variable on labour immigration with absolute 
values. As a direct consequence of the small number of observations in my data, I will in 
section C swap out the independent variable “education” with some additional control 
variables. In section D the variable labour immigration with absolute values, is coded into a 
one year lagged variable. It is likely to expect that attitudes do not change overnight, and 
using a one-year lagged variable might give more accurate results on how levels of general 
trust is affected by labour immigration from EU.  
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A) Independent variable: labour immigration with absolute values  
 
 
 
 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and *, ** and *** indicates significance at 90%, 95 % or 99 %.  
Years: 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008, Groups: 7 regions in Norway 
 
Dependent variable: Most people are trustworthy 
    Number of obs. 28  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Table 1.  Normal reg Random effects Panel corrected std. Error 
Independent variables  B p-value B p-value B p-value 
Labour immigration(log transformed)  -0,28*** 
0,00 
 (0,09) -0,28*** 
0,00  
(0,09) -0,27*** 
0,00 
(0,070) 
Immigration bad or good 0,09 
 
0,58 
(0,14) 0,08 
0,53 
(0,14) 0,09 
0,34 
(0,089) 
Trade Union member  -2,08*** 
0,01  
(0,85) -2,08*** 
0,01 
 (0,85) -2,07*** 
0,00 
(0,534) 
Years of education(log transformed)  1,84 
0,14 
(1,25) 1,84 
0,14 
(1,25) 1,81* 
0,08 
(1,04) 
_cons:  5,82*** 
0,01  
(2.20) 5,82*** 
0,01 
(2,20) 5,89*** 
0,00 
(1,92) 
R-squared  
 
0,301 
 
0,301 
 
0,319 
F-test(prob> chi22) 
 
0,03** 
 
0,03** 
 
0,00*** 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses*, **, *** indicates significance at 90%, 95 % or 99 %.   
Years: 2002, 2004, 2006 and 2008, Groups: 7 regions in Norway 
Dependent variable: Most people will treat you  fair  
   Number of obs.  28 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Table 2. Normal reg Random effects 
Panel corrected std. 
Error 
Independent variables  B p-value B p-value B p-value 
Labour immigration(log 
transformed)  -0,17*** 
0,01 
(0,07) -0,17*** 
0,01 
(0,07) -0,16*** 
0,00 
(0,06) 
Immigration bad or good -0,08 
0,33 
(0,09) -0,08 
0,33 
(0,09) -0,08 
0,12 
(0,05) 
Trade Union member  -0,69 
0,23 
(0,58) -0,69 
0,23 
(0,58) -0,62 
0,07* 
(0,34) 
Years of education(log transformed)  0,644 
0,47 
(0,89) 0,644 
0,47 
(0,89) 0,66 
0,32 
(0,67) 
_cons:  8,66*** 
0,00 
(1,61) 8,66*** 
0,00 
(1,606) 8,52*** 
0,00 
(1,18) 
R-squared    0,22   0,22 
 
0,39  
F-test(prob> chi22)   0,02**   0,02**   0,00*** 
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Table 1: Most people can be trusted.  
According to the results in all three of my models in table 1, the dependent variable measuring 
the number of labour immigrants to Norway has a negative and significant effect on a 1 % 
level on the dependent variable, “Most people are trustworthy”. Moreover these results 
reveals that when all other independent variables are kept constant, and the independent 
variable “Labour immigration” increases by one percent11, it will lead to a change of                 
-0,28, in model 1 and 2, and -0, 27, in model 3 in the dependent variable, “people are 
trustworthy”. Secondly table 1 also reveals that the variable “Trade union member” has a 
negative and significant effect on a 1 % level in all three models. Every time the variable 
“Trade union member” increases with one unit, the dependent variable will decrease by 2, 08 
                                                     
11
 Log transformed independent variable: when X increases by one percent – instead of unit like normally - Y 
increases/decreases according to the number reported in the coefficient (Skog, 2004 p. 241-42).  
 
 
Dependent variable: Most people are helpful 
    
Number of obs. 28  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Table 3. Normal reg Random effects  
Panel corrected std. 
Error 
Independen variables  B p-value  B p-value  B p-value  
Labour immigration(log transformed)  -0,17*** 
0,00 
(0,06) -0,17*** 
0,00 
(0,06) -0,17*** 
0,00 
(0,05) 
Immigration bad or good 0,23*** 
0,01 
(0,08) 0,23*** 
0,01 
(0,08) 0,23*** 
0,00 
(0,05) 
Trade Union member  -0,24 
0,64 
(0,52) -0,24 
0,64 
(0,52) -0,24 
0,58 
(0,43) 
Years of education(log transformed)  -0,77 
0,31 
(0,76) -0,77 
0,31 
(0,76) -0,77* 
0,06 
(0,41) 
_cons:  9,24*** 
0,00 
(1,31) 9,24*** 
0,00 
(1,31) 9,24*** 
0,00 
(1,03) 
R-squared   0,10   0,10   0,69 
F-test(prob> chi22)   0,00***   0,00***   0,00*** 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and *, ** and ** indicates significance at 90%, 95 % or 99 %.  
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in model 1, 2 and with 2, 07 in model 3. The independent variable “Immigration bad or 
good” and the variable “years of education” do not have sufficient significant results in any of 
the three models presented here. The F-test do not report significant results on the chosen 
level of significance (1%) in model 1 and 2, but does so in the model with panel corrected 
standard errors. Based on the results in model 3 I can reject the null hypothesis of the F-test 
and conclude that the variables have here a collectively significant effect on people’s trust in 
others. 
Table 2: Most people will treat you fair.   
In table 2 I find that the independent variable, “labour immigration”, effect on the dependent 
variable to be negatively significant on a 1 % level in all three of the models. The coefficients 
informs that when the variable “labour immigration” increases by one percent – since the 
variable is log transformed - the belief that “most people will treat you fair” decreases with  0, 
17 in model 1 and 2 and 0, 16 in model number 3. The variable “trade union member” does 
not have a significant effect on a 1 % level, and at best it reports only 90 % significance in the 
third model. The other two variables, “immigration bad or good” and “years of education” 
does not produce any significant effect on the dependent variable in any of the three models 
presented in table 2.  The F-test reports that there is not a significant result on a 1% level in 
either model one or two, while in model three, the panel corrected standard errors, there is a 
significant result and I can from this model conclude that the variables are collectively 
significant to the dependent variable “most people will treat you fair”.  
 
In table 3: Most people are helpful.  
 In table 3 the independent variable “labour immigration” reports a negative, but significant 
effect on a 1 % level on the dependent variable “most people are helpful” in all three of the 
models. When the number of labour immigrants increases with one percent – since it is log 
transformed - the coefficient reports that the belief that “most people are helpful” decreases 
with 0, 17 in all three models. The second independent variable “immigration good or bad”, is 
also negatively significant on a 1 % level in all three of the models, and with every unit that 
the independent variable increases with peoples belief that “most people are helpful increases 
with 0,23. Neither of the control variables, “Trade Union member” or “years of education” is 
not either significant on a 5 % level or below in any of the three models. The p-values of the 
F-test also report that the three models are significant below a 1 % level meaning that I can 
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reject the null hypothesis, and conclude that the independent variables used in each three 
models are collectively significant to the variable “most people are helpful”(Midtbø, 2012  
p.147). 
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B) Independent variable: labour immigration with relative values  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent variable: Most people are trustworthy  
    Table 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Number of obs. 28 Normal reg Random effects  Panel corrected std. Error 
Independent variables  B p-value  B p-value  B p-value  
Labour immigration(%)  -0,43*** 
0,00 
(0,15) -0,43*** 
0,00 
(0,15) -0,42*** 
0,00 
(0,14) 
Immigration good or bad 0,21 
0,12 
(0,13) 0,21 
0,12 
(0,13) 0,21*** 
0,01 
(0,09) 
Trade Union member  -1,71** 
0,02 
(0,76) -1,71 
0,02** 
(0,76) -1,63*** 
0,00 
(0,51) 
Years of education(log transformed)  2,55 
0,08* 
(1,46) 2,55 
0,08* 
(1,46) 2,5* 
0,09 
(1,48) 
_cons:  1,17 
0,73 
(3,40) 1,17 
0,73 
(3,40) 1,26 
0,7 
(3,47) 
R-squared    0,35   0,35   0,31 
F-test(prob> chi22)   0,03**   0,03**   0,00*** 
Standard errors are reported in parantheses, and *, ** and *** indicates significance at 90%, 95 % or 99 %.  
Dependent variable: Most people will treat you fair  
    Table 5.  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Number of obs. 28  Normal reg Random effects  Panel corrected std. Error 
Indepdent variables  B p-value  B p-value  B p-value  
Labour immigration(%)  -0,14 
0,21 
(0,11) -0,14 
0,21 
(0,11) -0,095 
0,4 
(0,11) 
Immigration bad or good for country  -0,04 
0,65 
(0,10) -0,04 
0,65 
(0,10) -0,04 
0,83 
(0,08) 
Trade Union member  -0,29 
0,60 
(0,56) -0,29 
0,60 
(0,56) -0,29 
0,80 
(0,45) 
Years of education(log transformed)  0,09 
0,94 
(1,07) 0,09 
0,94 
(1,07) 0,09 
0,84 
(1,18) 
_cons:  8,32*** 
0,00 
(2,53) 8,32*** 
0,00 
(2,54) 8,32*** 
0,00 
(2,75) 
R-squared    0,22 
 
0,22 
 
0,24 
F-test(prob> chi22)   0,20 
 
0,20 
 
0,00*** 
Standard errors are reported in parantheses, and *, ** and *** indicates significance at 90%, 95 % or 99 %.  
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Dependent variable: Most people are helpful 
     Table 6 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Number of obs. 28  Normal reg Random effects  
Panel corrected std. 
Error 
Variables  B p-value  B p-value  B p-value  
Labour immigration(%)  -0,07 
0,48 
(0,10) -0,07 
0,48 
(0,104) -0,07 
0,50 
(0,108) 
Immigration bad or good for 
country  0,29*** 
0,00 
(0,09) 0,29*** 
0,00 
(0,093) 0,29*** 
0,00 
(0,078) 
Trade Union member  0,56 
0,28 
(0,53) 0,56 
0,28 
(0,532) 0,56 
0,32 
(0,572) 
Years of education(log 
transformed)  -1,86* 
0,06 
(1,02) -1,86* 
0,06 
(1,020) -1,86* 
0,10 
(1,148) 
_cons:  9,91*** 
0,00 
(2,36) 9,91*** 
0,00 
(2,363) 9,91*** 
0,00 
(2,712) 
R-squared    0,03   0,03   0,59 
F-test(prob> chi22)   0,00***   0,00***   0,00*** 
Standard errors are reported in parantheses, and *, ** and *** indicates significance at 90%, 95 % or 99 %.  
 
Table 4: Most people can be trusted:  
 The independent variable “Labour immigration” in table 4 reports a significant effect on the 
dependent variable with a p-value significant on a 1 % level in all of the three models. When 
“Labour immigration” increases by one unit, the dependent variable, level of trust in others 
decreases with 0, 43 in model one and two and 0, 42 in the third model. The second 
independent variable “Immigration bad or good” has no significance to the dependent 
variable in either model one or two, but it is significant on a 1 % level in the third model. The 
coefficient in the third model reports that when the variable “Immigration bad or good” 
increases by one unit, the trust in others increases by 0, 21. The variable “Trade Union 
member” is only significant on 5 % level in model one and two, but are however significant 
on a 1 % level in model 3. The coefficient in model 3 tells us that when the variable “Trade 
Union member” increases by one unit, the trust in others decreases by 1, 63. The last 
independent variable “Years of education” is not significant on a 1 % level in any of the three 
models, and I can therefore not reject the null hypothesis, saying that variable has no effect on 
the dependent variable. The F-test reveals that only the third model, the panel corrected 
standard error model, is significant on a 1 % level, and I can therefore here reject the null 
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hypothesis and conclude that the variables are collectively significant to the dependent 
variable.  
 
Table 5: Most people will treat you fair:  
In table 5 neither of the independent variables have a significant effect on a 1 % level – not 
even on a 5% or a 10 % level. Consequently I cannot reject the null hypothesis of any of the 
independent variables in these models, meaning that they have no significant explanatory 
power on the dependent variable “Most people will treat you fair”. Finally the F-test is non-
significant on a 1 % level in model 1 and 2, but are however significant in the third model.  
 
Table 6: Most people are helpful:  
In table 6 the independent variable “labour immigration (%)” as no significant explanatory 
effect on the dependent variable in any of the three models. The second independent variable, 
“Immigration bad or good” on the other hand, has a significance of 1 % in all three models. 
Meaning that when the attitude toward immigrants improves with one unit, the belief that 
most people are helpful increases with 0, 29 in all three models. The last two control variables 
“Trade union member” and “Years of education” has no significant effect on the dependent 
variable on a 1 % level. The results from the F-test reveals that the independent variables used 
in the three models are collectively significant at a 1 % level, and I can therefore here reject 
the null hypothesis that they are collectively non-significant to the dependent variable.  
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C) Adding additional control variables:  
Table 7, 8, 9 and 10 will contain the same variables as in section A, only difference here is 
that the independent variable “Education” will be swapped out and four new control variables 
will be added, to test their explanatory effect on the dependent variables.     
Table 7 Trustworthy Fair Helpful 
Number of obs. 28 Panel corrected std. Error 
Panel corrected std. 
Error Panel corrected std. Error 
Independent variables B p-value B p-value B p-value 
Labour immigration(log)   -0,17*** 
0,00 
(0,06) -0,12*** 0,00 -0,21*** 
0,00 
(0,03) 
Immigration bad or good   0,16 
0,13 
(0,11) 
 
0,02 0,74 0,21*** 
0,01 
(0,09) 
Trade Union member  -1,45** 
0,05 
(0,75) 
 
-0,70** 0,04 -0,55 
0,24 
(0,47) 
yrbrn  03,01 
0,62 
(0,01) -0,13 0,14 -0,00 
0,59 
(0,01) 
_cons:  -1,96 
0,93 
(21,69) 34,39** 0,04 16,69 
0,31 
(16,39) 
R-squared   0,26  0,41  0,68 
F-test(prob> chi22)  0,04**  0,00***  0,00 
       Table 8 Trustworthy Fair Helpful 
Number of obs. 28 Panel corrected std. Error 
Panel corrected std. 
Error Panel corrected std. Error 
Independent variables  B p-value B p-value B p-value 
Labour immigration(log)  -0,13*** 
0,00 
(0,04) -0,12*** 
0,00 
(0,03) -0,22*** 
0,00 
(0,04) 
Immigration bad or good   0,04 
0,62 
(0,07) -0,08 
0,26 
(0,07) 0,20** 
0,02 
(0,07) 
Trade Union member  -0,63 
0,39 
(0,73) -0,19 
0,68 
(0,47) -0,52 
0,31 
(0,51) 
Dissatisfied with economy  -1,01*** 
0,00 
(0,27) -0,25 
0,31 
(0,25) 0,07 
0,68 
(0,18) 
_cons:  9,35*** 
0,00 
(0,56) 9,70*** 
0,00 
(0,44) 7,99*** 
0,00 
(0,58) 
R-squared   0,44  0,39  0,68 
F-test(prob> chi22)  0,00***  0,00***  0,00*** 
Standard errors are reported in parantheses, and *, ** and *** indicates significance at 90%, 95 % or 99 %. 
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Table 9 Trustworthy Fair Helpful 
Number of obs. 28 
Panel corrected std. 
Error 
Panel corrected std. 
Error Panel corrected std. Error 
Independent variables  B p-value B p-value B p-value 
Labour immigration(log)   -0,22*** 
0,00 
(0,05) -0,15*** 
0,00 
(0,03) -0,22*** 
0,00 
(0,04) 
Immigration bad or good   0,25** 
0,03 
(0,12) -0,02 
0,80 
(0,07) 0,19*** 
0,00 
(0,05) 
Trade Union member  -1,97*** 
0,01 
(0,75) -0,59* 
0,07 
(0,32) -0,47 
0,31 
(0,46) 
Work contract   1,05** 
0,02 
(0,45) 0,42 
0,22 
(0,35) 0,04 
0,87 
(0,22) 
_cons:  8,19 
0,00 
(0,87) 9,34 
0,00 
(0,47) 8,01 
0,00 
(0,54) 
R-squared   0,36  0,40  0,68 
F-test(prob> chi22)  0,00***  0,00***  0,00 
Standard errors are reported in parantheses, and *, ** and *** indicates significance at 90%, 95 % or 99 %. 
 
Table 10 Trustworthy  Fair  Helpful 
Number of obs. 28 
Panel corrected std. 
Error  
Panel corrected std. 
Error 
Panel corrected std. 
Error 
Independent variables  B p-value  B p-value  B p-value  
Labour immigration(log)  -0,17*** 
0,00 
(0,06) -0,13 
0,00 
(0,30) -0,21*** 
0,00 
(0,04) 
 
Immigration bad or good   0,18** 
0,05 
(0,09) -0,05 
0,40 
(0,05) 0,19*** 
0,00 
(0,04) 
Trade Union member  -1,49** 
0,04 
(0,73) -0,37 
0,33 
(0,38) -0,49 
0,25 
(0,43) 
 
Unemployed in more than 3 
months  -1,13 
0,23 
(0,94) -1,07* 
0,09 
(0,62) 0,58 
0,30 
(0,56) 
_cons:  8,97*** 
0,00 
(0,67) 9,77*** 
0,00 
(0,32) 7,91 
0,00*** 
(0,56) 
R-squared   0,30  0,45  0,69 
F-test(prob> chi22) 
 
0,01***  0,00***  0,00*** 
Standard errors are reported in parantheses, and *, ** and *** indcates significance at 90%, 95 % or 99 %. 
 
 
.  
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Table 7 – year of birth:  
In table 7 I added the independent variable “Year of birth, but it has no significant 
explanatory effect on any of the three dependent variables, and I will therefore not reject the 
null hypothesis that this variable has no explanatory effect on the dependent variables.  
In table 8 I have included the control variable “Dissatisfied with the economy” – a dummy 
variable – and it is significant on a 1 % level to the dependent variable “Most people are 
trustworthy”. The coefficient tells us that when the number of people being dissatisfied with 
the economy increases by one unit, the belief that people are trustworthy decreases by 1, 01. 
The control variable has no significant explanatory effect on the other two dependent 
variables “Most people will treat you fair” and “Most people are helpful”.  
In table 9 the dummy variable “Work contract” is included in the list of control variables. The 
regression analysis presented in the table, shows no significant results and one can therefore 
not reject the null hypothesis here. The control variable has no significant explanatory effect 
on the dependent variables.    
In table 10 I have included the control variable “Unemployed in more than 3 months” – a 
dummy variable. The results presented in the tables reveals that the variable has no significant 
effect on either one of the three dependent variables, and the results are thereof validating the 
null hypothesis.  
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D) 1 year lagged: labour immigration variable with absolute values:  
      
Table 11 Trusthworthy 
 
Fair Helpful 
Number of obs. 21 Panel corrected std. 
Error 
Panel corrected std. 
Error 
Panel corrected std. 
Error 
Independent variables  B p-values  B p-value  B p-value  
Labour immigration (log) 1 year 
lagged.  
-0,15*** 0,00 
(0,06) 
-0,11** 0,02 
(0,05) 
-0,22*** 0,00 
(0,05) 
Immigration bad or good for country  0,06 0,32 
(0,06) 
-0,09 0,15 
(0,07) 
0,14** 0,04 
(0,69) 
Trade Union member  -1,37* 0,06 
(0,74) 
-0,22 0,73 
(0,63) 
-0,66 0,34 
(0,69) 
Dissatisfied with economy  -0,85*** 
 
0,01  
(0,30) 
-0,37 0,27 
(0,33) 
0,11 0,69 
(0,27) 
_cons:  9,61*** 0,00  
(0,68) 
9,81*** 0,00 
(0,52) 
8,51*** 0,00 
(0,73) 
R-squared   0,48  0,44  0,68 
F-test(prob> chi22)  0,00***  0,00***  0,00*** 
 
Table 11: Labour immigration (absolute values) - lagged with one year:   
In table 11 the independent variable “Labour immigration” is lagged with one year. The table 
tells us that the variable has a significant explanatory effect on the dependent variable “Most 
people can be trusted” and “Most people are helpful”. When the variable “Labour 
immigration” increases by one percent – since it is log transformed – the dependent variable 
“Most people can be trusted” decreases by 0,15 and “Most people are helpful” decreases with 
0,22. The variable has only 5 % significance on the variable “Most people will treat you fair”, 
and I can therefore only in the case of “Most people can be trusted” and “Most people are 
helpful” reject the null hypothesis. Neither the control variable “Immigration bad or good” 
nor the control variable “Trade Union member” reports any significant results on any of the 
three dependent variables in table 11. After running the additional analysis on the four 
additional control variables, section C revealed that the variable “Dissatisfied with the 
economy” had significant explanatory effect on the dependent variable “Most people can be 
trusted”. I have therefore decided to add this variable as one of the control variables in the 
analysis of table 11. The control variable is also in this analysis significant on a 1 % level 
when it comes to the dependent variable “Most people can be trusted”, and with every unit it 
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increases with the perception of trust in others decreases by 0,85. Finally the F-test of all the 
three tables reports a significant result, meaning that the variables have a collectively 
significant explanatory effect on each of the three dependent variables presented in table 11.  
Compared to the table 1, 2 and 3 the effect on labour immigration is weaker after the variable 
was lagged with one year.  
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6.0 Conclusion  
 
In this research project the main inquiries have been:  
1) A theoretical analysis of the causality between general trust and welfare  
2) Empirical evidence of the causality between labour immigration and general trust in Norway.  
The aim of this research project has first of all been to acquire a better insight and 
understanding into how the implications of coordinated social security schemes could come to 
or is affecting attitudes of general trust in Norway. Furthermore I have assessed in what way 
coordinated social security schemes can come to sway the Scandinavian welfare state’s ability 
to reproduce high levels of general trust reinforcing its legitimacy.  
The causality between general trust and the modern welfare state in Europe and more 
specifically Scandinavia and Norway can be understood in two ways. The welfare state was a 
tool in the nation building, used to generate feelings of solidarity among the citizens and 
loyalty to the state itself. Alternatively one can also argue that the welfare state was a product 
of solidarity itself. The boundaries of the nation state greatly contributed to regularisation of 
social and economic life by reducing transaction and information cost. Then established social 
structures or/and extraordinary opportunity structures created by the aftermath of the 2
nd
 
world, opened up for coalition building and finally the support of the welfare state.  
After the institutionalization of the modern welfare state throughout Europe in 1970s, the 
causality between general trust and the welfare state has surely become reciprocal. From a 
path-dependency perspective the coordinated social security schemes from EU becomes a 
challenge to the welfare state, because it alters the institutional structure guarding the exit and 
entry of the national welfare state. Independently of the causality between general trust and 
modern welfare states, the boundaries of the nation state have been essential to creating a 
reliable environment and safeguarding resources.  
The extensive character of the Scandinavian welfare programs both in terms of services and 
transfers, assisting and aiding citizens throughout their life-cycle, is a costly affair. The 
economic revenue needed to fund such an inclusive and generous welfare states, makes it 
absolutely necessary for the Scandinavian states to maximize employment and collect high 
taxes from its members. General trust is a key component of the welfare state, because it 
enhances the willingness and reduces the perceived risks of contributing to the collective 
interest. In the Scandinavian states the levels of general trust are known to be exceptional 
high, among citizens and also toward the state itself. The boundaries of the modern 
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citizenship in Scandinavia came to be an important tool for social categorization and 
identification, enabling general trust to be built. The loss of traditional boundary-structures 
could potentially come to weaken the state’s ability to reproduce general trust and to reinforce 
its own institutional legitimacy. The Scandinavian welfare regime is therefore especially 
vulnerable to social coordinated security as the membership entry and exit is isomorphous 
with the territorial boundaries of the nation state. 
 
 
 
  
  Boundaries of the nation state 
 
The results from my analysis tell me that there is a strong causality between labour 
immigration from the EU and the levels of general trust in Norway between 2004 and 2008. 
One the one hand increased labour immigration from the EU have clearly affected levels of 
general trust negatively; on the other hand attitudes toward immigrants have, as demonstrated 
in figure 5.1 improved during this time period.  
From a theoretical viewpoint improved attitudes toward immigration can be explained by the 
likelihood that people tend to become more accustomed to the unknown after getting used to 
it. From an empirical viewpoint this can be explained by the necessity for labour immigration 
that existed in the labour market in Norway during this time period. The labour immigration 
reduced the stagnation from the general population – due to old age – on the labour market. 
The financial crisis in 2008 did not have similar effect on the economy in Norway as 
elsewhere in Europe. It is not unlikely to believe that the attitudes toward immigrants would 
have been different if there had been an economic recession or higher levels of unemployment 
in Norway. Additionally the labour immigrants from Eastern European countries are usually 
The Scandinavian  
Welfare state  
General trust  
Legitimacy: 
Employment and 
tax-contribution  
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driven by the motive of employment when choosing location. This has resulted in a much 
higher redistribution of immigrants in the regions of Norway, and in some municipalities it 
has even interfered and slowed down the process of centralization.  
Theories on social capital argue that the interaction we have with others by participating in 
organizational life makes us more collectivistic and identifying with a group makes us feel 
more morally obliged to take part in collective interests that benefit the group, despite what 
our own self-interest might be. General trust is not only the individual’s willingness to 
support common good, but it is also the belief that so will others. Although EU law ensures 
labour immigrants from EU, certain rights similar to citizens when staying in Norway, they 
are not obliged to integrate into the society like other citizens or other more permanent types 
of immigrants are. Secondly the labour immigrants from Eastern European countries tend to 
stay in Norway for shorter periods of time. It is also likely that we will find it harder to 
identify with a labour immigrant from Eastern Europe compared to a labour immigrant from 
Germany or Sweden, and usually we prefer common good when the receiver is someone we 
can identify with. On the other hand the labour immigrants from Eastern Europe cannot be 
said to be undeserving because they are lazy - usually they have very high labour activity. 
One of the most frequent debates in the media has been the use of Norwegian welfare in other 
EU countries, and especially in Eastern Europe where the income and price level is much 
lower than Norway. The Norwegian welfare benefits are calculated according to Norwegian 
standards; and it has been a political goal that it should always be more attractive, if healthy, 
to be employed. Currently the welfare transfers being exported still remains very low, but it is 
likely to believe that when labour immigrants get more accustomed to and aware of their 
rights in the social security system this will increase. With the Eastern European labour 
immigrants being male and in the age between 20 and 45; they usually are not eligible for 
welfare connected to sickness. Moreover the export of pension to Eastern Europe will 
definitely be one of the largest social security transfers in the future, but on the other hand this 
transfer was already made exportable prior to the coordinated social security. The cash benefit 
to families has created a lot of turmoil in the media – although the total transfer is not very 
high. The use of the benefit has decreased rapidly among Norwegians, while it is increasingly 
used by Eastern European labour immigrants. The debate can perhaps we viewed as a de-
legitimizing debate, and as a symbol on how the support of the common good in the welfare 
state, is not extended to the labour immigrants from Eastern Europe. The levels of general 
trust are still high in Norway, and I do not believe that the legitimacy of the welfare state as a 
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whole is in question. The Norwegian population already demands more control of welfare 
transfers – not only toward labour immigration but in general to fight abuse. With the 
coordinated social security the Norwegian state has lost its absolute autonomy in the social 
realm, but the welfare program and its content remains a national prerogative. The decrease in 
general trust and the likelihood that people support collective interest in favour of self-
interest, might result in some welfare programs being revaluated, reduced or cut to better fit 
the new context created by the coordinated social security and the EU-enlargement to the 
East. Although the boundaries of the nation state no longer can offer a reliable environment 
and safeguard resources like they could before, the Eastern European EU enlargement in 
2004, 2007 and 2013 did not fulfil the prophesy of welfare magnets. On the contrary the 
labour immigration from Eastern Europe has been important in helping the Norwegian state 
keep up labour productivity and increase tax revenue needed for sustaining the welfare state.  
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